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NOTES
After the Wall: The Legal Ramifications
of the East German Border Guard
Trials in Unified Germany
Micah Goodman*
Introduction
Since the reunification of East and West Germany in 1990, the German
government' has tried over fifty2 former East German soldiers for shooting
and killing East German citizens who attempted to escape across the East-
West German border.3 The government has also indicted a dozen high-
ranking East German government officials.4 The German government
charged and briefly tried Erich Honecker, the leader of the German Demo-
cratic Republic (G.D.R.) from 1971 to 1989, for giving the orders to shoot
escaping defectors. 5 While on guard duty at the border between the two
* Associate, Rogers & Wells; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1996; B.A., Swarthmore
College, 1991. The author is the recipient of the 1996 Morris P. Glushien prize,
awarded annually by Cornell Law School to a student whose Note addresses a topic of
current social concern.
1. When this Note refers to "the German government" or "the government," absent
specification of East or West, it refers to the government of post-1990 unified Germany.
2. This Note was written in the spring of 1995. Therefore, although the author has
tried to update facts and figures to reflect current reality, some information may be
outdated. Former East German soldiers, however, continue to be indicted for pre-Unifi-
cation crimes. As such, this Note's premise remains topical.
3. In June 1991, the Government brought the first such indictment against four
East German border guards. At that time, the Minister of Justice of Berlin announced
that it was investigating 175 shootings at the Berlin Wall. John Tagliabue, Berlin Wall
Guards Accused of Shooting Escapees, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1991, at 1, 6.
4. See, e.g., John Tagliabue, Four Ex-Officials of East Germany Arrested, N.Y. Tis,
May 22, 1991, at A3 (reporting the arrest of four former members of the East German
National Defense Council, the G.D.R.'s most important military unit. See infra note 55.);
Leon Mangasarian, Honecker Successor Charged with Berlin Wall Shootings, DEUTSCHE
PREssE-AGENUR, Jan. 9, 1995, at Int'l News (reporting the indictment of Egon Krenz,
former leader of the G.D.R., and six Politburo colleagues).
5. The East German government originally brought charges against Erich Honecker
in June, 1990, before the unification of Germany. The charges related to the murder of
East Germans who tried to escape under his regime and to the use of automatic weapons
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Germanys, the soldiers allegedly shot and killed nearly 600 East German
citizens who attempted to escape to the West.6 Government officials, act-
ing under Chairman Honecker, allegedly took part in giving the orders to
shoot 7 The charges against the former guards and officials have ranged
from murder to manslaughter, and the German government continues to
bring indictments.8
The border guard trials have caused much controversy. The German
Supreme Court recently held the trials constitutional under the Constitu-
tion of the former West Germany.9 But, was that ruling correct? This Note
will examine the ramifications of trying East German solders as criminals
under East German law. The prosecution's argument is that the border
guards violated the East German Penal Code, which prohibited murder. 10
and mines on the border. Anne McElvoy, Honecker to be Tried for Murder, THE TIMES,
June 30, 1990, at 10. See generally discussion infra Part Ml.A.
6. For years, the official estimate of East Germans shot while trying to escape was
approximately half that number. Philip Sherwell, 600 Died Fleeing E. Germany, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Aug. 11, 1993, at 10. Recent evidence puts the current count at 588. Rick
Atkinson, Searching for Truth by the Wall: East German Files Reveal New Cases of Fatal
Refugee Shootings, WASH. PosT, Aug. 13, 1993, at A29.
7. Whether the government gave explicit orders to- shoot escaping citizens has been
a central issue of controversy in the border guard trials. Guards have claimed that,
although they may have shot attempted escapees, they were only following orders. Marc
Pitzke, East German Border Guards on Trial Viewed Defectors as "Pigs," RuTERs NoRTH
AMERICAN WIRE, Sept. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Int-News Library, Arcnws File (quot-
ing one of the defendant border guards in the first trial. The guard stated that "[we]
were obliged to stop escape attempts by more than one person with the use of firearms.
I only acted according to orders. I had absolutely no chance to treat this person any
other way."). See infra notes 116-129 and accompanying text.
8. In June, 1996, one of the most recent indictments ended with a border guard
receiving a threeoand-a-half-year prison sentence. Three-year Prison Term Given to Berlin
Wall Border Guard, AGENCE FRANCE PRFssE, June 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curmws File. The guard was convicted of killing a West German doctor who
had crossed the Berlin Wall from West Berlin in 1981, bringing to 41 the number of
adjudicated border guard trials. Id. Not all of the trials have resulted in murder convic-
tions. See Kerstin Rebien, Court Hits E. German Leaders with Arrest Warrants, REurERs
WORLD SERvicE, Nov. 14, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (stating
that only 29 border guards have been convicted of murder). Of the trials that have
resulted in convictions, most have also been followed by suspended sentences. Id.;
Three-year Prison Term Given to Berlin Wall Border Guard, supra. See also infra note 131.
9. In November 1996, Germany's Supreme Court upheld lower court decisions on
the constitutionality of the border guard trials by holding that neither border guards nor
higher officials could claim immunity from prosecution when their actions violated
established human rights and naturaIjustice. Court Clears Wayfor East German Trials,
UPI, Nov. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
The Supreme Court's holding was the culmination of an appeal by former East Ger-
man Defense Minister Heinz Kessler, his top aide Fritz Strelitz, and former communist
boss Hans Albrecht. They were appealing their 1993 conviction for responsibility for the
orders to shoot to kill East German citizens attempting to escape to West Germany. See
infra note 111. The effect of the Supreme Court's holding will be that "border guards
who shot those seeking to escape and top officials who framed communist East Ger-
many's border policy are liable for their actions under federal German law." Court
Clears Way for East German Trials, supra.
10. Article 112 of the East German Penal Code provided that murder was a crime
punishable by ten years to life in prison. Penal Code of the German Democratic Repub-
lic of January 12, 1968, art. 112 (Murder), reprinted in LAw AND LEGISLTION IN THE
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However, from the East German point of view, that statute conflicts with
the orders given border guards, which allowed shooting anyone escaping to
the West as a last resort.'1 The crucial issue is whether the standing order
for the border guards to shoot defecting East Germans was legal. If the law
was valid, Germany should not prosecute soldiers for obeying it.
Part I of this Note will briefly detail the history of the events leading up
to the trials, including accounts of the border guards' actions. An impor-
tant component of this issue is the question of who had authority over the
border guards. Part II will describe the current situation regarding the vari-
ous trials of the border guards and higher officials. Part III will describe
and analyze East German law, as set out in the Penal Code and the Consti-
tution of the former G.D.R. Those documents address such issues as illegal
emigration, murder, and the punishment for both. The courts must use the
documents to determine the legality of shooting escaping citizens. Part IV
will examine both the criminal and constitutional roles of international law
in the G.D.R. It is important not only to determine if the order to shoot
defectors violated East German law, but also whether it violated interna-
tional law. Finally, Part V will attempt to determine whether Germany has
jurisdiction to adjudicate crimes committed in East Germany, a country
with a different criminal code.
At issue are claims for actions which took place in a different state,
under a different legal system. This Note will conclude that the orders, to
shoot to kill defectors, given by high officials to the border guards were
legal. If the orders were legal, then so too, by extension, were the actions.
Therefore, German courts do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims
against either former East German border guards or the leaders they
served.
I. Background of Dispute
A. Post-War Germany-Division
After the Allied victory in the Second World War, Germany was divided
into four zones of administration: American, British, French, and Soviet.'
2
The four powers were to occupy Germany jointly for a brief period 13 to
ensure that the country underwent proper "denazification, demilitariza-
tion, democratization, decentralization, and decartelization."' 4 However, it
became quickly apparent that a fundamental ideological rift existed among
the Allies.15 Great Britain, the United States, and eventually France,
GERMAN DaaiocRATic REPUBLIC, 1966-1968, 2/68, at 14, 55 [hereinafter GDR Penal
Code]. See discussion infra Part lII.B.
11. Tyler Marshall, Pitfalls in the Pursuit of Justice: The Case Against 4 Former East
German Border Guards is Trying the Nation's Legal System. Should a Democracy Judge
Events that Occurred Under Communist Rule?, L.A. Tnms, Jan. 13, 1992, at Al.
12. HENRY ASHBY TURNER, JR., THE Two GEamAxN's SINCE 1945, at 9 (1987).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 12.
15. NoRMAN GELB, THE BELrIN WALL: KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV, AND A SHOWDOWN IN
THE HEART OF EUROPE 29 (1986). Within about a year after the joint occupation of Ger-
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wanted to allow Germany to industrialize rapidly so as to free the West
from the burden of supporting the country. However, the Soviet Union had
no such desire. 16
The most significant step toward the final and complete alienation of
the western from the eastern section of Germany occurred in 1948. In that
year, the Western occupying powers both extended the Marshall Plan of
economic aid and introduced a new currency into their respective zones of
occupation, excluding the Soviet zone.17 This move consolidated the west-
ern zones. 18 The Soviet Union retaliated by blockading West Berlin and
cutting off supply lines from West Germany to the now-isolated city in the
eastern zone. 1
9
The West was able to airlift sufficient supplies into West Berlin to keep
the city alive until the Soviets lifted the blockade in 1949.20 However, the
Berlin blockade severely strained relations between the Soviet Union and
the West.2 1 This marked the beginning of the Cold War. More impor-
tantly for the future of Germany, the blockade convinced the Western pow-
ers that they must act swiftly and decisively. 22 The Western powers
accelerated the political development already underway: in 1949, the three
Western zones officially became the Federal Republic of Germany
(F.RG.)-West Germany. 23 Later that year, the Soviets turned their zone
into the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.)- East Germany.2 4 Ger-
many's division had become a fact of international politics. 25
From the beginning, East Germany could not compete economically
with West Germany. The F.R.G. quickly became an economic powerhouse
with the benefit of Western aid.2 6 By contrast, the G.D.R. government
chose to centralize the means of planning and production, and the econ-
omy stagnated from the outset. Within a few years of the division of Ger-
many, the G.D.R. became one of the most centrally planned economies in
many, it became clear that the Soviet Union saw things very differently from the West.
The Soviet Union was engaged, for example, in a "systematic campaign to stifle %vester-
oriented political movements that had begun to re-emerge in the rubble of the city." Id.
16. TURNER, supra note 12, at 14.
17. Id. at 23-24.
18. GELB, supra note 15, at 32.
19. Id. at 33-34.
20. TURNmR, supra note 12, at 26-27.
21. GEIB, supra note 15, at 39.
22. TuRNER, supra note 12, at 27.
23. GELB, supra note 15, at 39.
24. Id.
25. MANFRED GORTEMAKER, UNIFYING GERMANY: 1989-1990, at 17 (1994).
26. The F.R.G. instituted a system of welfare capitalism, which combined private
ownership and production, subject to market forces, with the governmental intervention
of a welfare state, to insure a more even distribution of productivity. TURNER, supra note
12, at 58. The success of the policy of welfare capitalism quickly became known as an
economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder), and the F.R.G. saw enormous economic growth.
Id. at 59. Industrial output continually increased, wages rose, and luxury goods, such
as cars and electronic appliances, became commonplace. Id. at 59-60.
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the world. 27 The government of the G.D.R. discouraged private enterprise
and, by 1952, over three-quarters of the industrial workers in the G.D.R.
worked in state-owned enterprises.28
The East German centralized economy achieved a certain economic
success, marked by significant industrial output.29 However, this success
failed to meet the peoples' needs. 30 There was no effective allocation of
resources, capital productivity was low, raw materials were wasted, and
there was no incentive to keep technologically current.31 As a result, prices
did not reflect value. The supply of basic goods was erratic, and most peo-
ple could not afford luxury goods, even if such goods were available.32
Indeed, it was common to go outside the official supply system; citizens
resorted to barter, rather than dealing in cash.33
The failure of the G.D.R's socialized economy, combined with a politi-
cally repressive regime, led to an enormous outflow of people to the
West.3 4 Between 1949 and 1961, over 2.5 million East Germans, from a
27. DAVID M. KEiTHLY, THE CoLLAPsE OF EAsT GERmAN COMMUNSM: THE YAR THE
WALL CAME DOWN, 1989, at 60 (1992). The East German Constitution compelled cen-
tralization. Id. at 59. The Constitution stated in Article 9(1): "The national economy of
the German Democratic Republic is based upon the socialist ownership of the means of
production." VERFASSUNG [Constitution] art. 9(1) (G.D.R.) (reprinted as The Constitu-
tion of the German Democratic Republic of 6 April 1968 as modified by the Law amend-
ing the Constitution of the German Democratic Republic of 7 October 1974, at 14). In
addition, Article 9(3) stated in part: "The German Democratic Republic bases itself on
the principle of the management and planning of the national economy and all other
social spheres. The national economy of the German Democratic Republic is socialist
planned economy." VERFASSUNG, supra, art. 9(3).
28. TuRNER, supra note 12, at 109.
29. Id. at 111-12.
30. Despite attempts to convince the citizens of the G.D.R. that their lives were as
good as those of West Germans, the East German government was not able to disguise
the difference in living standards between the two countries. GELB, supra note 15, at 39.
The gap in living standards only increased as the Soviet Union extracted much of the
G.D.R.'s industrial profit, labelling it war reparations. TuRnm, supra note 12, at 111.
The Soviet Union sometimes dismantled and shipped entire factories out of the G.D.R.
Attempts to centralize agricultural production, manufacturing, housing construction,
and the distribution of goods made things worse. The result was endless shortages and
recurring bottlenecks, and "[a] cloud of discontent settled over East German workers
and professionals." GELB, supra note 15, at 40.
31. KErrHLY, supra note 27, at 64-66.
32. Id. at 67. G.D.R. prices for durable goods were, by any standards, exorbitant.
The waiting lists to purchase were equally bad. The Trabant, one of the two cars pro-
duced in East Germany, was made of fiberglass, not steel. With a two-stroke engine, it
was capable of top speeds of little more than 50 miles an hour. Nevertheless, it cost over
20,000 Marks, more than a year's salary, and was available only via a ten-year waiting
list. Id.
33. For an amusing account of how the barter system typically worked, see ROBERT
DARroN, BERLIN JOURNAL, 1989-1990, at 148-56 (1991). Darnton tells the story of two
Trabant repairmen and what people with broken cars had to do to get them fixed. It was
impossible to obtain parts through the state system. People required resourcefulness to
find many goods, and often could only put them to use through barter. Id. at 150.
34. Tumm, supra note 12, at 109-10. Rather than lose their independence under
privatization, many farmers and independent business people left. They were accompa-
nied by "those East Germans who could not accept the increasingly stringent ideological
constraints in intellectual and cultural activities." Id.
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total population of about 17 million, fled to the West.3 ' To stem the tide,
in 1961 the East German government dosed off the entire 858-mile border
between the two states.36 The only part of the border that remained open
was in Berlin where the three Western Allies still maintained military
forces.37 From 1949 to 1961, between 100,000 and 330,000 East German
citizens left the G.D.R. each year,38 virtually all of them through Berlin.39
Their number amounted to twenty-five percent of the G.D.R.'s original pop-
ulation.40 From the East German point of view, something had to be
done. 41
B. The Wall
1. Construction
In 1961, in response to the flood of departures to the West, Erich
Honecker, then the second highest ranking official in the G.D.R., super-
vised the building of the Berlin Wall.42 Built on August 13, 1961, 43 the
35. A. JAMEs McADAMS, GERMANY DIVIDED: FROM THE WALL TO REUNIFICATION 5
(1993).
36. GELB, supra note 15, at 39. The G.D.R. dosed off the border everywhere but in
Berlin. In so doing, the G.D.R. implemented the practices that it would maintain with
heightened care and efficiency within Berlin after 1961, the year the Berlin Wall went up.
The border between the two Germanies was what became known as the Iron Curtain-
barbed wire running the length of the country, surrounded by land mines, supple-
mented by guards with machine guns in watch towers with searchlights. Id.
37. Id. at 44.
38. GORTEMAKER, supra note 25, at 36.
39. Escape to the West through Berlin was comparatively easy before 1961. People
frequently crossed from East to West to visit family or to work on the other side. Occa-
sionally, the visitors found it easy to stay. GELB, supra note 15, at 44.
40. H.G. PErER WALtACH & RONALD A. FRA'cisco, UNmm GERMANY: THE PAST, POLI-
TICS, PROSPEcts 28 (1992).
41. The East German government tried to stem the flow of refugees by erecting
barbed wire on the border. See supra note 36. However, by 1957, the loss of labor was
so bad that the government both increased production demands on the remaining work
force and added a new offense to its criminal code-leaving the country without authori-
zation. GELB, supra note 15, at 44. Article 213 of the Penal Code of the G.D.R. states
that "[a] person who ... without government authority leaves or fails to return to the
German Democratic Republic is liable to imprisonment of up to two years." GDR Penal
Code, supra note 10, art. 213 (Unauthorized Frontier Crossing), at 76. Of course, the
escapee would have to be caught, an event which rarely happened. GELB, supra note 15,
at 44.
42. In 1961, when he supervised the construction of the Wall, Honecker was still
acting under the then-Chairman of the Communist Party Walter Ulbricht. Honecker was
simultaneously secretary of security for the Central Committee of the Communist Party,
secretary of the National Defense Council, the organization which oversaw border secur-
ity, and a full member of the Politburo. He became President of the G.D.R. upon
Ulbricht's resignation in 1973. Obituary of Erich Honecker, DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 30,
1994, at 21.
43. The East Germans literally built the Wall overnight. German military police
began to erect barbed wire and bricks at 1:00 a.m. on August 13, and completed the job
in skeleton form by daybreak. For a very good account of the process, see GELB, supra
note 15, at 148-65. The end result was a wall with guard towers, barbed wire fences,
vehicle barricades, mines, and rifles set up automatically to shoot anyone trying illegally
to cross the guarded area. Marjorie Miller, Former E. German Leaders Charged in Border
Killings, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1995, at A4.
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Wall was effective.4 4 As a result, the total number of refugees from the East
dropped to under 5,000 per year.4 5 Of those, only a few dozen per year
escaped directly across the border.4 6 In addition, the government man-
aged to keep legal emigration to a relatively low, controlled number.
4 7
More significant is the number of people who were killed trying to
escape from the G.D.R. During the twenty-eight years that the Wall sealed
the border between East Germany and the rest of the world, almost 600
people, most of them East German, were killed trying to escape from the
East to the West.4 8 They were either shot or killed by one of the other
means at the guards' disposal. 49
Escape from the East was practically impossible.5 0 Guards patrolled
the border twenty-four hours a day, with orders to shoot would-be escap-
ees.5 1 Border guards underwent special training which encouraged them
to shoot defectors.5 2 The official endorsement and encouragement of the
shoot-to-kill policy has been a significant item of controversy at the trials.
5 3
44. The Wall served its purpose. It kept G.D.R. citizens in the G.D.R., and the coun-
try became the highest producing communist country in the world. WALLACH & FRAN-
cisco, supra note 40, at 28.
45. GORTEMAKER, supra note 25, at 36.
46. Id. at 36 n.12. Most of those who managed to leave the country did so by vari-
ous means, such as not coming back from trips abroad, hiding in cars or on trains, and
other means which did not directly challenge the border guards. Id.
47. Between 1962 and 1988, with a few exceptions, emigration from the G.D.R.
hovered between 12,000 and 20,000 per year. In 1989, when the Berlin Wall was taken
down, the number rose sharply to 348,854. WALLACH & FRA cISco, supra note 40, at 31
(Chart: Total Emigration from the GDR, 1962-1988).
48. See ATKaNsON, supra note 6.
49. Marc Fisher, On Trial for Death at Berlin Wall; Guards Say They Only Followed
Orders in Shooting Men Who Fled, WASH. PosT, Sept. 10, 1991, at A21. Gelb provides
further details:
The leveled area [behind the Wall] is a desolate, dangerous no-man's land,
patrolled by Kalashnikov-toting guards, dotted with free-fire machine-gun
emplacements, and sown in places with landmines. It is punctuated with 285
elevated watchtowers . . . and by a series of dog runs where ferocious, long-
leashed Alsatians effectively run free. It is not a safe place to be.
GELB, supra note 15, at 4-5.
50. The area immediately on the Eastern side of the Wall had a number of booby
traps designed to prevent anyone from even reaching the Wall. In addition to the
guards, dogs, minefields and automatic guns, see supra note 49, there was the Wall itself.
If one were able to reach the Wall safely, that person would still have enormous diffi-
culty actually getting over due to the "thick, smooth-surfaced, ungrippable cement tub-
ing affixed to its top to prevent people from doing just that." GEL, supra note 15, at 5. A
number of people who made it past the life-threatening dangers to the Wall were stopped
by the Wall itself. Id.
51. See infra note 134.
52. The guards went through a special training program, earned higher salaries than
other soldiers of comparable rank, and were part of a system designed above all to
encourage them to shoot defectors while maintaining secrecy about that policy. Fisher,
supra note 49. Members of the Stasi, the secret police, also reportedly monitored guards'
conversations with each other and threatened to throw guards in jail if they expressed
reservations about shooting border-crossers. Id.
53. It is unclear whether there was an actual written order, or merely an understand-
ing tantamount to a written document. See discussion infra Part III.
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According to a statement provided by the German Ministry of Justice
on November 30, 1990, at the beginning of the trial process, the govern-
ment issued a warrant for Erich Honecker's arrest after discovering "writ-
ten orders by the former East German leader for guards at the Berlin wall to
shoot to kill people who were seeking to flee the country."54 One such
order, dated May 3, 1974, was the product of a meeting of the East German
National Defense Council (N.D.C.). 55 At that meeting, President Honecker
supposedly said, "Now as ever, firearms must be ruthlessly employed when
attempts are made to cross the border, and those comrades who success-
fully use their weapons are to be praised."5 6 More clear is that both before
and after that order, Honecker and the N.D.C. ensured that the guns and
mines employed on the border were continuously upgraded and kept in
perfect working order.57
2. Destruction
For twenty-eight years, the Berlin Wall was an impregnable symbol of the
divide between East and West. The Wall made the separation, initially con-
sidered temporary, a permanent one.58 But in 1989 the Wall began to
crack and, eventually, it crumbled. The beginning of the end of the Wall,
and the G.D.R., occurred on May 2, 1989, when Hungary, which had its
own Iron Curtain, opened its border to Austria.5 9 East Germans were
already allowed to travel freely to Hungary.60 Now, for the first time in
almost thirty years, they could also travel to the West. By September, over
54. John Tagliabue, Evolution in Europe: Honecker's Arrest Sought in Berlin Wall
Shootings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1990, at A23.
55. Id. The National Defense Council was East Germany's highest military body. It
oversaw, among other things, the construction and maintenance of the East-West border.
The Council consisted of the most senior leaders of East Germany, including former
Party Chairman Honecker, former secret police chief Erich Mielke, former Prime Minis-
ter Willi Stoph, former Secretary of the National Defense Council Fritz Streletz, Hans
Albrecht, and former Defense Minister Kessler. All except Honecker were arrested on
May 21, 1991, to stand trial for what the Berlin Justice Minister called their "shared
responsibility" for the "order to fire indiscriminately at those seeking to breach the bor-
der." Tagliabue, supra note 4.
56. Tagliabue, supra note 54.
57. Throughout the duration of the Wall's existence, 1961-1989, Honecker, former
defense minister Heinz Kessler, and other members of the N.D.C., ordered constant
improvements in the weaponry, shooting devices, and mines used to stop East Germans
trying to escape to the West. Marc Fisher, Fallen Strongman in the Dock: Germany's Trial
of Aged, Still Defiant Honecker Raises Questions, WASH. PosT, Dec. 1, 1992, at A28. In
addition, the Government alleged that Honecker and his colleagues "routinely met to
discuss ways to hinder escapes and their orders were that 'the border must be made even
harder to get through."' Honecker Linked to Deaths of 49 who Fled, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
1992, at All.
58. GORa ,mAR, supra note 25, at 23.
59. McADAms, supra note 35, at 193. Hungary had maintained a barbed wire border
between itself and Austria, similar to the intra-German border, complete with guard tow-
ers and automatic rifles. However, on May 2 Hungary announced that within a year it
would completely dismantle its frontier barrier. KErmLY, supra note 27, at 109.
60. Members of Warsaw Pact states, including East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslo-
vakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland and the Soviet Union, allowed travel among Warsaw
Pact states. The Members only restricted travel to the West. See, e.g., Georg Brunner,
Vol. 29
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110,000 East Germans had fled to West Germany.6 1
The first crack in the G.D.R.'s physical seal stemmed from outrage over
the fraud surrounding the May 7, 1989, national election.6 2 The ruling
Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland,
or S.E.D.) had received 95.98% of the vote.6 3 This was no surprise, since
the S.E.D. usually won elections with 99% of the vote. 64 In fact, the S.E.D.
had not lost an election since the first national election in 1950.65 Despite
historic acceptance of this practice, in May, 1989, East Germans refused to
accept the results of the election. They took to the streets, organizing there-
tofore unheard-of monthly demonstrations demanding political reform.
66
The S.E.D. was facing growing domestic political opposition as well as
an enormous refugee movement out of the country.6 7 Some people contin-
ued to leave through Hungary, and others began to demonstrate on a regu-
lar basis. Leipzig, a cultural and intellectual center in the eastern state of
Saxony, became the meeting place for weekly demonstrations. The crowds
grew in size from 5,000 on September 25, to 150,000 by October 16.68
People demonstrated for the right to leave, but also for the right to stay and
be free.6 9
The Honecker government could not stand before the popular
onslaught. On October 18, Erich Honecker resigned as Chairman of the
Central Committee of the S.E.D. 70 and was replaced by Egon Krenz.7 1 The
people received Krenz with skepticism and mistrust, viewing him as merely
continuing Honecker's policies.72 The citizens of the G.D.R. continued to
pressure the S.E.D. for reform.73 In the week following Krenz's ascen-
dancy, a demonstration in Leipzig drew a crowd of 250,000.74 On Novem-
ber 4, a rally in Berlin drew almost a million people. 75 The people
demanded free elections, free expression, and the resignation of the gov-
ernment. 76 In response, on November 6, the Krenz government
Freedom of Movement, in BEFoRE REFoRMs: HumAN RIGHTS IN mE WARSAW PACt STATES,
1971-1988, at 187-231 (Georg Brunner ed., 1990).
61. GORTEMAKER, supra note 25, at 64.
62. Id. at 59-60.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Tumum, supra note 12, at 100. At the polls, officials would present voters with a
list of candidates, and give voters the choice to either approve or veto the list as a whole.
By making the voting process all or nothing, the S.E.D. virtually guaranteed an almost-
unanimous endorsement of the S.E.D. slate. Id. People were not surprised that the
S.E.D., as with the Communist party in the Soviet Union, regularly achieved 98% voter
turnouts, and 99% endorsement of candidate lists. Id.
66. GORTENtKER, supra note 25, at 59-60.
67. Id. at 70-71.
68. Id. at 70.
69. Id.
70. KErmY, supra note 27, at 163.
71. Id. at 164.
72. Id. at 163-64.
73. Id. at 165.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 172.
76. Id.
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announced what were, at best, ambiguous new travel laws.77 It was not
enough, and when 750,000 East Germans protested and threatened to
strike, the government announced on November 9 what the people wanted
to hear: citizens of the G.D.R. could travel freely to the West.7 8 In the days
following the easing of travel restrictions,'millions of East Germans trav-
eled to West Germany.79 Most returned, their desire for change temporar-
ily satisfied. However, the Leipzig demonstrations continued, and East
Germans made new demands on the government.80 Now, they wanted
nothing less than national reunification. 8'
C. Post-Wall Germany-Reunification
The S.E.D. did not support reunification because it would have meant
abandonment of the socialism for which the G.D.R. stood.82 In the end, it
did not matter what the S.E.D. wanted. With the first free East German
elections scheduled for March 18, 1990, politicians and activists formed
over twenty-five political parties, all of which competed for seats in the East
German parliament.83 The S.E.D., opposed to unification,84 won only six-
teen percent of the vote.85 The Christian Democratic Union (C.D.U.), the
Eastern counterpart of F.R.G. Chancellor Helmut Kohl's C.D.U. party, ran
on a platform advocating reunification86 and won over forty percent of the
vote.87 The C.D.U., recognizing its mandate to pursue reunification, even-
tually passed the necessary measures through the parliament. 88
Reunification needed the approval of both Germanies. 89 Chancellor
Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany had been publicly com-
mitted to the idea of unity since December, 1989.90 The actual unification
of the Germanies occurred on October 3, 1990, under the terms of the
Treaty on German Unity.91 According to the Treaty, the G.D.R. "ceased to
exist as a state in its own right,"92 having entered into a union with the
77. McADAms, supra note 35, at 198-99. Although seeming to grant the right to leave
the country for 30 days each year, the new laws also contained numerous qualifications,
all of which made the law ambiguous at best, and restrictive at worst. Id.
78. Id. at 199.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 200.
83. WALLACH & FRANcisco, supra note 40, at 56-57 (table listing parties and repre-
sentation achieved).
84. Id. at 53.
85. Id. at 56 (table). The S.E.D. was also known as S.E.D.-PDS. PDS stood for Party
of Democratic Socialism.
86. Id. at 53.
87. Id. at 56 (table).
88. Id. at 58-59.
89. GORTAKER, supra note 25, at 129.
90. Id.
91. Federal Republic of Germany-German Democratic Republic: Treaty on the
Establishment of German Unity, Aug. 31, 1990, F.R.G-G.D.R., 30 L.L.M. 457 (1991)
(entered into force Sept. 29, 1991, October 3, 1990) [hereinafter Treaty on German
Unity].
92. Id. at Introductory Note.
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F.R.G. under the terms of Article 23 of the Basic Law of the F.R.G.93
The Basic Law, drafted in 1949,94 stated one of its primary goals in
the Preamble: "The entire German people is called upon to accomplish, by
free self-determination, the unity and freedom of Germany."95 The Basic
Law applied initially only to West Germany, although the Preamble stated
that in drafting the law West Germany "acted also on behalf of those
Germans to whom participation was denied."96 In the event that the goal
of reunification was reached, Article 23 of the Basic Law stated that the
Basic Law would then be "put into force for other parts of Germany on
their accession."97 In other words, former West German law would govern
unified Germany.
II. Current Situation-The Trials
A. The Proceedings
After reunification, there was a public outcry to bring to justice those who
were responsible for crimes that occurred under the G.D.R. communist
regime. 98 The unified German government responded with measures pre-
viously unheard of in East Germany. InJune, 1991, the Berlin prosecutor's
office indicted four former border guards who were responsible for shoot-
ing the last attempted escapees over the Wall. 99 That attempt had been
made in February, 1989,100 months before the G.D'R. opened the border.
Over fifty guards 10' have been indicted and tried for murder or man-
slaughter in courts in and around Berlin in forty subsequent arrests and
trials. 10 2 An express provision of the Treaty on German Unity provided
that the "[I]aw of the German Democratic Republic valid at the time of
signing of this Treaty... shall remain in force in so far as it is compatible
with the Basic Law."10 3 As a result, the guards have been indicted under
93. GRuNDGESETZ [Constitution] (F.R.G.) (reprinted as The Bonn Constitution: Basic
Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (1949)). There were arguments made for and
against unification in this manner. The other option was to discard the Basic Law and
the G.D.R. Constitution and to draft a new constitution. In the end, both countries
found it best for the G.D.R. to come under the umbrella of the Basic Law, a document
that had already been proven. GORTEmAKER, supra note 25, at 200-02.
94. America, Britain, and France drafted the Basic Law, which was then submitted to
the 11 West German state parliaments for approval. When it passed, on May 24, 1949,
the Federal Republic of Germany became an official country. TuRNER supra note 12, at
36.
95. GRuMGESETz, supra note 93, pmbl.
96. Id.
97. Id. art. 23.
98. Tyler Marshall, Berlin Test Case: Can Border Guards be Punished for Shootings at
Wall?, L.A. TimEs, Sept. 3, 1991, at A14.
99. Tagliabue, supra note 3.
100. Id.
101. Robin Gedye, Generals Go on Trial for Killings at Berlin Wall, THE DAILY TEtI-
GRAPH, Aug. 25, 1995, International, at 11.
102. The most recent trial concluded in June 1996. A Berlin judge gave a former
border guard a three-year sentence. Three-year Prison Term Given to Berlin Wall Border
Guard, supra note 8.
103. Treaty on German Unity, supra note 91, art. 9. See discussion infra Part V.B.1.
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former East German law, although the trials have been conducted using
West German courtroom rules.104
An initial problem, quickly dismissed, was the fact that the judges who
tried the first cases were all from the West.105 East German judges initially
were not able to conduct trials in unified Germany. Because West German
law was to govern the new state,10 6 East German judges who remained in
service had to undergo retraining in West German law, a process which
took months. 10 7 The guards' defense attorney in the first trial objected to
West German judges trying the cases against the border guards. 10 8 How-
ever, the court overruled the objection.10 9
The Berlin Prosecutor has also indicted most of the surviving major
political figures who were involved with the construction and maintenance
of the sealed border between East and West. There have been four sets of
high-level indictments. First, in May 1991 the state indicted Erich
Honecker'1 0 and five of his colleagues from the National Defense Coun-
104. Tyler Marshall, Pitfalls in the Pursuit ofjustice; The Case Against Four Former East
German Border Guards is Trying the Nation's Legal System. Should a Democracy Judge
Events That Occurred Under Communist Rule?, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1992, at Al, All.
During Germany's existence as separate states, West German law did not apply to East
Germany. Likewise, after reunification, West German law cannot be retroactively
applied to alleged crimes that occurred in East Germany. Germany; Punishment or Par-
don? TH EcONOMIST, Oct. 16, 1993, at 52, 57. Therefore, the trials are being conducted
under East German law. Although judges have not admitted that East German law
would absolve the guards from all responsibility, it is arguable that shooting escaping
defectors was legal in the G.D.R. Id. See discussion infra Part III. Indeed, that is a
fundamental premise of this Note.
105. Anne McElvoy, Ex-Guards Put on Trial for Wall Death, THE TIMES, Sept. 3, 1991,
Overseas News, at 9.
106. See supra note 93 and accompanying discussion.
107. McElvoy, supra note 105. The first step in the process of reforming the judiciary
was to investigate all former East German judges and evaluate the extent of official cor-
ruption, connections with the Communist party, and connections with the secret police
(Stasi). DanielIJ. Meador, Transition in the German Legal Order: East Back to West, 1990-
1991, XV B.C. IN-r'L & CoMP. L. Rav. 283, 297 (1992). The investigations were to deter-
mine whether the judge "has engaged in activity in the GDR that raises serious questions
about his fitness to serve in a democratic legal order, in a regime of government under
law." Id. If judges seemed to have given overly harsh sentences in what appeared to be
purely political cases, they were disqualified. Id. Likewise, involvement with the Stasi
was grounds for dismissal. Id. G.D.R. judges who passed evaluation were allowed to
continue to serve in their official capacities, and were required to attend courses in
F.R.G. law, which they are now required to apply. Id. at 299.
108. McElvoy, supra note 105.
109. Id.
110. The government issued a warrant for Honecker's arrest, in December 1990, just
after reunification. Tagliabue, supra note 3. However, Honecker left Germany in March
1991 for Moscow and took refuge in the Chilean embassy in December 1995. Honecker
Linked to Deaths of 49 who Fled, N.Y. TimEs, June 4, 1992, at All. The government
originally charged Honecker with responsibility for four deaths. In May 1992 that
number was revised upward to 49. Id. In July 1992 Chile returned Honecker to Ger-
many, where he faced charges of giving orders to shoot defectors. Honecker is Jailed for
"Wall" Deaths, Cm. Tia.,July 30, 1992, at 3. However, Honecker's trial was cut short in
January 1993, due to his diagnosis with terminal liver cancer. He immediately flew to
Chile to join his already-exiled wife and daughter. Marc Fisher, Honecker Freed by Ger-
many, Flies to Chile, WASH. Posr, Jan. 14, 1993, at A26. Erich Honecker died in Chile in
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cil. 111 Second, in January 1995 the state indicted Egon Krenz, 1 12
Honecker's successor to the presidency of the S.E.D., and six of his
Politburo colleagues.1 13 Next, eight former East German generals were
accused of manslaughter and went on trial in Berlin in August 1995.114
Finally, the trial of six other former generals began in October, 1995.115
On behalf of the border guards, former Defense Minister Kessler of the
National Defense Council denied that killing East German defectors was
official policy. Although he said that he "regretted any 'unnatural' deaths
that occurred," he also "insisted there were no high-level orders to kill peo-
ple trying to escape East Germany."'1 6 This argument is not believable. If
there were no orders, the implication would be that the border guards were
May 1994. Robin Gedye, Erich Honecker, Builder of Berlin Wall, Dies in Exile, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, May 30, 1994, at 1.
111. Robin Gedye, Illness Forces Delay in Honecher's Trial, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 13,
1992, International, at 17. See also supra note 55. When Honecker's trial began, six
former Politburo members were on trial. See supra note 110. Former Party Chairman
Honecker was eventually judged too ill to stand trial, and was allowed to rejoin his wife
and daughter in Chile, where he died in May, 1994, of liver cancer. See Obituary of Erich
Honecker, supra note 42. Adrian Bridge, Three East German Ministers Jailed Over Wall
Deaths, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 17, 1993, at 12. Former state security bureau (Stasi)
chief Mielke and former Prime Minister Stoph were also judged too ill to stand trial. Id.
Of the remaining three members of the National Defense Council, former Defense Minis-
ter Kessler was sentenced to seven-and-a-half years in jail, Deputy Defense Minister
Streletz to five-and-a-half years, and district Communist Party boss Albrecht to four-and-
a-half years. Id. However, Kessler, Streletz, and Albrecht were freed to appeal their
sentences. Miller, supra note 43.
112. Rick Atkinson, Seven Germans Charged in Deaths at Wall, WASH. POST, Jan. 10,
1995, at A14; Steve Crawshaw, Krenz Charged with Border Killings, THiE INDEPENDENT,
Jan. 10, 1995, at 9.
113. Krenz, who ascended to power on October 18, 1989, after Honecker resigned,
remained in office just six weeks. On December 3, 1989, popular discontent forced
Krenz to step down. Miller, supra note 43. See also Crawshaw, supra note 112.
114. Gedye, supra note 101. The eight generals were members of the Defense Minis-
try's committee on long range planning, and were accused of formulating the instruc-
tions to the border guards to kill escaping East Germans. Id.
115. Kerstin Rebien, East German Generals on Trialfor Border Killings, REuTmas NORTH
AmEmc~AN WiR, Oct. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuna File. The
defendants, who were accused of playing a key role in securing and reinforcing the auto-
matic and deadly devices which protected the East-West border, consisted of former
deputy defense minister Klaus-Dieter Baumgarten, the general in charge of border secur-
ity, and four subordinate generals. Id. In September, 1996, these six generals all
received sentences of more than three years, with Baumgarten receiving a six-and-one-
half-year term. Mary Williams Walsh, Ex-Generals Get Prison in Germany, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1996, at All.
116. Shoot-to-Kill Policy is Denied, Couamn-JouNA., Dec. 8, 1992, at 4A. It is entirely
likely that former Defense Minister Kessler is correct, that there were, in fact, no written
orders. One of the problems the government has faced is its inability to produce a writ-
ten document for submission as evidence. Anne McElvoy, Germany Puts Itself on Trial,
THE TIMES, July 31, 1992, at B12. However, the government asserts that since soldiers
had orders which they were required to obey, the case does not depend on the existence
of actual written orders. Id. Rather, the government asserts that after the National
Defense Council meeting of 1974, which "formalise[d] the niceties of incarceration and
issued a statement declaring 'Now as before for attempts to break through the border,
there must be ruthless use of firearms,' everyone from the unit commander to the 19-
year-old wielding a gun in the spotlight knew what it meant." Id.
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acting on their own when they shot escaping citizens, thus taking the law
into their own hands. Given the guards' upbringing in the G.D.R., a state
subject to an intense rule of law, and their training in military discipline,
independent action of such magnitude seems unlikely.117 Indeed, their
border guard training demanded that they exercise no such independent
thought; rather, it demanded that they do what they were told.118 In this
case, they had been told to shoot.119
In accordance with the existence of shoot-to-kill orders, the standard
defense argument at each trial has been that the border guards, in shooting
escaping citizens, were acting under color of law. 120 Although the prosecu-
tion may not be able to find a copy of an explicit order to shoot citizens
attempting to escape over the border, Honecker himself has referred to his
having "issued or approved such an order."121 Before returning to Berlin in
1992, Honecker declared from Moscow, "I consider it a scandal that the
border guards should be imprisoned when they have done nothing other
than carry out their duty in accordance with their oath of loyalty." 122 Fur-
thermore, even if there was no express written order, the border guards
thought there was,123 and they have been supported by their superiors.
Some of the superiors have tried to take responsibility for the shootings,
stating that the guards were merely following orders.124
117. One of the soldiers at the first trial testified: "We were soldiers--conscripts-who
had to obey orders or face military prison." Tamara Jones, E. German Guards on Trial:
Can Justice Scale the Wall?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at Al.
118. Id.
119. See supra note 7.
120. In his opening statement at the first border guard trial in September 1991, Rolf
Bossi, lead defense counsel, argued that "the trial should be immediately terminated
because such shootings were legal under the former East German law. 'The East Ger-
man citizen had no right to freely exit the country,' he told the court." Marshall, supra
note 98.
121. Stephen Kinzer, Senior East Germans Go on Trial; Critics Ask if Such a Case Is
Just, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1992, at A8. At one point in the trial against Honecker, the
trial judge paused to read some other examples of high-level statements which, if not
technically orders to shoot, could be understood as nothing else. The judge read:
A 1958 border guards' manual: Guards must chase down fleeing countrymen.
"Shoot them if necessary," it says. A 1961 report by Mr. Honecker: One man
was shot as he tried to swim to West Berlin. He sank, Mr. Honecker reported,
but happily no bullets hit Western territory. A 1962 note from the National
Defense Council: Some soldiers were not convinced that their fleeing country-
men were "opponents who needed to be arrested or eradicated... there is too
little well-aimed use of weapons in these cases." A 1969 note to Politburo mem-
bers: "Against border violators and criminals, weapons are to be used."
George Rodrigue, Called to Account; Ethical Issues Complicate Ex-E. German Leader's Trial
for Acts of Toppled Regime, DALLAS MORNWG NEws, Dec. 14, 1992, at IA.
122. David Gow, Honecker Refuses to be Tried for His Actions Whilst in Office, THE
GuiL-r-, Oct. 11, 1991, at 10.
123. See discussion supra note 116.
124. Francine S. Kiefer, Germany Puts Eastern Guards on Trial for Border Shootings,
CHRInMSAN Sca. MoNUrrOR, Sept. 4, 1991, at 4. In a letter to Parliament in 1991, four for-
mer East German generals accepted responsibility for the shootings and said that blame
did not lie with the lower-level guards, as they were just following orders. Id.
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Indeed, whether there were orders or not may not matter. At the first
border guard trial, the judge asserted that, regardless of orders, the border
guards nevertheless had an obligation not to shoot,1 25 stating that
although shooting to kill was technically legal under East German law, it
infringed on "'basic human rights' and a higher moral law."126 Later, at
the second trial, the trial judge said that regardless of the shoot-to-kill
orders at the border, guards did not have to kill lone, unarmed escapers.' 27
Instead, they should have "aimed at [defectors'] feet."128 The German gov-
ernment, for its part, has argued at the border guard trials that the secret
shoot-to-kill orders violated international law, which East Germany had
accepted.1 29
Despite the initial negative judicial reaction against the accused
guards in the first two trials, the courts were initially largely unwilling to
accept the government's claims. As a whole, the trials have resulted in few
prison sentences and many suspended sentences and acquittals.' 30 For
example, in six consecutive cases in 1994 and 1995, only one guard was
actually sentenced to time in prison, while seven others were allowed to go
free, either on probation or with suspended sentences or acquittals.' 3 '
125. Stephen Kinzer, Two East German Guards Convicted of Killing Man as He Fled to
West, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1992, at Al. The judge stated that "[a]t the end of the twenti-
eth century, no one has the right to ignore his conscience when it comes to killing peo-
ple on behalf of the power structure." Id.
126. Adrian Bridge, Suspended Sentences for Border Guards, THE INDE'PNDENT, Feb. 6,
1992, at 10.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Charles A. Radin, East German Border Guard is Jailed; 3 Others are Freed in Wall
Shooting, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 21, 1992, at 1 ("A principal assertion of the prosecution
was that the secret shoot-to-kill orders were in violation of the Helsinki Accords and
Geneva Convention, both of which East Germany accepted."). See infra Part IV.
130. See, e.g., Rick Atkinson, Three Ex-East German Officials Sentenced; Former Top
Communists Found Guilty in Deaths of Refugees, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1993, at A34
(reporting that, as of then, two guards had been convicted, nine had received suspended
sentences, and 13 had been acquitted). Since 1993, although the exact count is unclear,
acquittals and suspended sentences have continued to far outpace convictions. See infra
note 131.
131. In one border guard trial, the defendants were convicted of attempted murder,
but were given 15 months' probation. Court Convicts Former East German Border
Guards, REUTES NORTH AmEuc.AN WimE, Aug. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Txtnws File. In the next trial, a former guard was given one year's probation.
Former East German Border Guard Convicted in 1956 Shooting, DETrscHE PRnssE-AGEN-
TuR, Nov. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, DPA File. Then, a former guard
received an 18-month suspended sentence, despite killing a defector and wounding the
defector's fiancee. Ex-E. German Guard Free After Shootings 30 Yrs Ago, REUTERS NORTH
AmEmuc.m WIRE, Dec. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txmws File. In the
next trial, a former guard was acquitted of manslaughter, despite killing a cyclist riding
back into the G.D.R. The judge acquitted him because it was unclear that the killing was
intentional. East German Border Guard Acquitted in Shooting, REtrRms WORLD SERvIcE,
Jan. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txmws File.
The next trial resulted in one of the few recent convictions. The judge sentenced a
former officer to three years in prison for shooting a defector who was entangled in
barbed wire and had already surrendered. East German Guard Jailed for 1966 Border
Shooting, RETRS WORLD SERviCE, Feb. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Txmvs File. In a subsequent trial, the judge reverted to the pattern of the other trials.
Cornell International Law Journal
However, the Supreme Court's November 1996 decision that the border
guard trials are constitutional will make future prosecutions more likely to
result in convictions. 132 This increased likelihood extends to both border
guards and higher officials. 133
B. Uniqueness of the Trials
One misconception which should be disposed of immediately concerns the
primary border guard defense. Defense counsel at trials of both officials
and border guards have claimed that the government gave, and the guards
followed, orders which were legal at the time. 134 Critics suggest that this
defense is similar to the defense dismissed at the Nuremberg trials of Nazi
war criminals after World War II. During those trials, numerous defend-
ants claimed that they were "just following orders" when they shot, tor-
tured, and executed millions of innocents. That defense was disregarded
under the principle that all individuals have an obligation to disobey
orders which are clearly illegal. 135 Nazis who attempted to claim their
innocence because they were just following the orders of their superiors
Two former guards were cleared of lower court convictions, which had resulted only in
one-year suspended sentences. Court Acquits East German Guard for Shots at Wall,
REurERs WORLD SERVICE, Feb. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
In a later trial, two former guards and their company commander were given suspended
one-year sentences. East German Guards Get Probation for Wall Shooting, Reu-rs
WORLD SERVICE, Feb. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txmws File. In that
case, the judge said that the lenient decision stemmed from the problem of reconstruct-
ing events from thirty years ago. Id.
132. Sentences Upheld for East Germans in Escapee Deaths, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 13, 1996,
News, at 13. Heinz Kessler, Fritz Strelitz and Hans Albrecht appealed their convictions
to the Supreme Court after their sentence in 1993. See supra note 111. They were not
alone in appealing an adverse decision to the highest court. In a separate action, Klaus-
Dieter Baumgarten appealed his six-and-one-half-year sentence of September 1996. In
November 1996, the Supreme Court ruled that East German leaders' orders to shoot to
kill violated international human rights laws and that border guards and those giving
the orders could legally be brought to trial. Former E. German Border Guards Chief
Arrested After Court Ruling, AGENcE FRANCE PR.SSE, Nov. 13, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, AFP File; Sentences Upheld for East Germans in Escapee Deaths, supra.
133. Erik Kirschbaum, Krenz Slams German Court on Berlin Wall Killings, Ramrs
NORTH AmERCAN WiPE, Nov. 13, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File
(citing Egon Krenz's acknowledgement that he is now more likely to be sentenced to
prison, in the wake of the Supreme Court's upholding sentences for former East German
leaders for ordering border guards to shoot to kill fleeing refugees). Although the indict-
ment against Krenz originally included six others, one, former union boss Harry Tisch,
has since died. Hans-Juergen Moritz, Justice Struggles to Deal with East German Leaders,
REuTERs WoRLD SERVICE, Aug. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
134. See, e.g., Ex-Border Guards on Trial in Berlin, CH. TIB., Sept. 3, 1991, at 8 (citing
argument that East German law outlawed escape from the G.D.R., and that East German
leadership issued orders to enforce the law. As one border guard's attorney stated,
"[s]oldiers of the National People's Army were simply fulfilling their duty to enforce the
law at the time."); Atkinson, supra note 112.
135. Elmo Zumwalt, Jr. &James Zumwalt, Four Guards Ordered to Kill, WASH. TiMES,
Sept. 20, 1991, at F3.
The impact of the Nuremberg trials was to put the onus on the individual soldier
to ask himself whether the activity he was being ordered to perform was legal or
illegal. If it was the latter, the order itself is an illegal one, and he is not obli-
gated to perform it.
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were found guilty of crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity on an individual basis.136
The trials of the border guards, although superficially resembling the
Nuremberg trials, in fact have little in common with that tribunal. Indeed,
"[tihere are ... dramatic and troubling differences between the proceed-
ings in Nuremberg and those in [border guard trial] Judge Seidel's court-
room."13 7 Regarding the accused, the Nuremberg trials involved many top
officials of the Nazi government and military who exercised a good deal of
power.138 In contrast, the Berlin trials involve largely "junior functiona-
ries."139 In addition, the alleged crime is different. Inhumane though both
crimes may be, genocide is not the same as legal killing.140 While the
Nazis "were charged with genocide of unprecedented barbarity; [the border
Id.
136. The International Military Tribunal which conducted the Nuremberg trials
imposed individual liability for violations of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in 1 NAzi CON-
SPIRACY AND AGGESSION 4, 5 (1946) [hereinafter Nuremberg Proceedings]. Since
individuals were liable, it was irrelevant whether they were following orders.
The Tribunal determined that three crimes fell under its jurisdiction:
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation, or
waging of war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agree-
ments or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such vio-
lations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation
to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied
territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas,
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslave-
ment, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian pop-
ulation, before or during the war; or persecution on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
Id. art. 6.
137. David Margolick, "Just Following Orders': Nuremberg, Now Berlin, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 1992, sec. 4, at 6.
138. The preface to the indictment and trial documents involved in the trials,
approved by Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States at Nuremburg,
refers to those on trial as "major Nazi war criminals." Nuremberg Proceedings, supra
note 136, at v. The indictment itself listed the individuals being charged and the organi-
zations to which they belonged. It is immediately clear that they were more than just
border guards. The 22 accused belonged to such organs of government as the Cabinet,
the Leadership Corps of the Nazi party, the Gestapo (secret police), and the general staff
and High Command of the German armed forces, to name a few. Id.
139. Margolick, supra note 137. Telford Taylor, counsel for the United States at
Nuremberg, has referred to the border guards as "nincompoops," by comparison. Id.
140. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
[hereinafter Genocide Convention], to which the G.D.. and the F.R.G. were signatories,
defines genocide to mean:
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national ethical, racial or religious group, as such:
a. Killing members of the group;
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
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guards] killed those deemed by their laws to be fleeing felons-just as
police everywhere have done since the invention of firearms." 141 In other
words, the border guards were doing their duty to enforce the laws and
protect the integrity of their state. They did not mount an aggressive attack
to eradicate whole populations, as the Nazis did. Rather, they were acting
as they thought necessary to protect the border from people who were on
notice as to the consequences of an escape attempt. 142 Lastly, the East
German Communist regime was not comparable in nature to that of the
Nazis.143
Thus, it is not immediately clear that the border guards cannot assert
the defense denied the Nazis; it is not clear that a defense of "just following
the N.D.C. orders" is invalid. Although that defense was rejected at Nurem-
berg, the circumstances of Communist East Germany are very different
from those of Nazi Germany. Indeed, German courts have implicitly held
that the situations are different. German courts have, in most cases, either
acquitted or given suspended sentences to indicted border guards, on the
grounds that they were following legal orders.' 44
III. East German Law
The universal principle that came from the Nuremberg trials is that carry-
ing out an illegal order of a superior does not excuse the commission of an
illegal act.' 45 The legality of the order is one way in which the border
guard cases differ from those arising out of Nazi Germany. Genocide was
dearly illegal under international law.146 In contrast, protecting the East
German border was legal under East German law and may have been legal
under international law, as well.
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; ....
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. I, Dec. 8,
1948, U.N.T.S. 277, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAw: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, at 395
(Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble eds., 3d ed. 1991).
141. Margolick, supra note 137.
142. It was not a secret, nor did the East German government try to keep secret, what
would happen to those caught attempting illegally to cross the border. However, some
seemed to take the threat more lightly than others. For example, one attempted escapee,
who testified against the guards in the first trial in 1991, stated that he knew of the risk,
but did not think that guards would shoot to kill. Jonathan Kaufman, Trying a Reluctant
Shooter; German Guard Faces Charges in Escapee's Death, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 17, 1991,
at 2.
143. As Heinz Gilinsky, the former director of the Council of Jews in Germany, has
been quoted as saying, "We have accused the S.E.D. [Communist] regime and its policies
of suppression, but by all means I will not agree to a comparison of crimes committed
by the Nazis-vhich have been unique in human history-with other crimes, to put them
in any type of relation." Horst Gemmer, Accountability for State-Sponsored Human Rights
Abuses in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 12 B.C. THiRD WORLD LJ. 241, 251.
144. East German Guards Get Probation for Wall Shooting, supra note 131.
145. Zumwalt & Zumwalt, supra note 135.
146. See Genocide Convention, supra note 140.
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A. The Constitution of the G.D.R.
Protecting the sovereignty of the G.D.R was a fundamental element of the
G.D.R. Constitution. Article 90 of the Constitution stated:
(1) The administration of justice serves to implement socialist legality, pro-
tect and develop the German Democratic Republic and its state and social
order. It protects freedom, peaceful life and the rights and dignity of man.
(2) It is the joint concern of socialist society, its state and all citizens to
combat and prevent crime and other violations of law.1 47
Protecting the "state and social order" was of paramount importance, as
seen further in Article 3(2), which established the principle of having one
political alliance as the key to the G.D.R's success. 148 In so doing, Article
3(2) emphasized that it "thereby implement[ed] the mutual relationship of
all citizens in socialist society on the principle that each bears responsibil-
ity for the whole."14 9 If each citizen bore responsibility for the whole, it
would stand to reason that any person who left the society committed an
affront to that whole.
The Constitution suggested that the protection of socialist society was
a legitimate concern.15 0 Former Defense Minister Heinz Kessler claimed in
court that this, in fact, was part of the motivation for the shoot-to-kill pol-
icy.15 1 Former President Honecker, before the same court earlier that
week, stated that he was concerned only with the health and safety of the
state.15 2 Without the Berlin Wall and the strict enforcement that accompa-
nied it, claimed Honecker, Germany would never have reunified, the Cold
War would never have ended, and the world would have been at risk of a
third world war.153 When he acted to reduce the tide of emigrees,
Honecker claimed that he was thinking only of the well-being of the G.D.R.
He told the court, "I lived for the German Democratic Republic." 154
Consistent with Kessler's concern with preventing acts with "bad con-
sequences" and with Honecker's desire to protect the integrity of the Social-
ist state, border guards were led to believe that border crossings were a
constant and dangerous threat.' 5 5 Guards were therefore constantly
147. VERFASSUNG, supra note 27, arts. 90(1) and 90(2).
148. Id. art. 3(2).
149. Id.
150. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
151. Rodrigue, supra note 121. Kessler is quoted as saying that he thought it was
important to maintain tight security on the border "so that fewer people would do things
that could have bad consequences." Id.
152. Honecker Defends Berlin Wall, CI. TRiB., Dec. 4, 1992, at 10. Honecker claimed
that if he had not built the wall to stop the flood of escapes to the West, the Soviet Union
would have intervened militarily as it did in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in
1968. Id.
153. Id.
154. Anna Tomforde, Honecker Says Trial Will Harm Bonn, THE GuARDIAN, Dec. 4,
1992, at 10 (quoting Honecker's testimony). Honecker did accept "political responsibil-
ity" for the killings at the Wall, but "without legal and moral guilt." Id.
155. Lutz Rathenow, a former border guard, wrote in the Berliner Zeitung that
guards were constantly fed information and rumors that well-armed groups
were planning to crash the frontier and would not hesitate to kill any soldier
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watchful for an attack either on the border or on themselves. If attacked,
they were ready to defend the border or themselves with deadly force.15 6
And although one could argue that an escaping citizen did not pose a
threat to the Socialist state that required preventing such threat with
deadly force, the G.D.R. Penal Code provided another justification.
B. The Penal Code of the G.D.R.
While the G.D.R. Constitution provided the general legal backdrop for
armed border protection, the G.D.R. Penal Code addressed such protection
more directly. The Penal Code had two distinct goals in this regard. The
first was specifically to stop illegal attempts to cross the border. The sec-
ond was generally to prevent crimes against the sovereignty of the G.D.R.
1. Attempts to Cross the Border
Article 213 of the Penal Code specifically prohibited unauthorized border
crossings, both into and out of the G.D.R. It stated: "[a] person who...
without government authority leaves or fails to return to the German Demo-
cratic Republic is liable to imprisonment of up to two years.... In serious
cases, the offender is liable to imprisonment of from one to five years." 157
While seemingly inconsistent with the relatively moderate penalties of Arti-
cle 213, the National Defense Council's orders to shoot defectors were not
inconsistent with G.D.R. law. The border guards were already legally
allowed to stop escape from East Germany by any means necessary.
Although Article 112 prohibited murder,'5 8 and Article 213 provided
only a maximum of five years in prison for an escape attempt, Article 18
gave border guards the freedom to violate both Article 112 and 213. Article
18 stated:
Criminal responsibility is reduced if the person who acts, as a result of a
presently threatening danger, which cannot otherwise be averted, to the life
or health of himself or another person, has, without his fault, been placed
into a state of great emotion or great distress and tried to avert this threat by
an attack on the life or health of other people.' 59
The law would absolve a border guard of all criminal liability if he was in a
state of emotional distress. Indeed, Reiner Oschmann, a former border
guard, stated:
who tried to stop them. "It was a classic Western situation, either them or us,"
he wrote. "In other words, they tried to keep us constantly ready to kill."
Kif Augustine Adams, What is Just? The Rule of Law and Natural Law in the Trials of
Former East German Border Guards, 29 STA. J. INT'L L. 271, 292 (1993).
156. Id.
157. GDR Penal Code, supra note 10, art. 213. Serious offenses included damaging
border installations, falsifying papers, attempting to cross the border in groups, or
repeated attempts to illegally cross the border. Id.
158. As noted supra note 10, anyone who deliberately killed another person risked
imprisonment for ten years to life imprisonment. GDR Penal Code, supra note 10, arts.
112(1), 112(2(1)) (Murder).
159. GDR Penal Code, supra note 10, art. 18(1) (State of Distress and Coercion).
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The so-called "protection of the frontier" always contained an element of
emergency. We were defending the line against West Germany, always
presented to us as the main culprit, the "imperialist enemy," ready and will-
ing to destabilise the socialist system in East Germany at any minute. As
such, we lived under constant stress.160
That the East German government never brought charges against the bor-
der guards indicates that the government did not consider their actions to
be wrong.
2. Crimes Against the Sovereignty of the G.D.R.
At the first border guard trial, a former guard said, "[Alt that time, I was
following the laws and commands of the German Democratic Repub-
lic."'16 1 The guards had been given orders which they believed were legal
and therefore had to be followed.' 6 2 It was especially important to fulfill
the order to shoot because an illegal border crossing was seen as "malign-
ing the sovereignty of the GDR."1 63 Since the Penal Code defined unlawful
frontier crossing as a criminal act, the border guards, as members of the
socialist society, had a duty to prevent any such attempt.164 As the Penal
Code stated:
The relentless punishment of crimes against the sovereignty of the German
Democratic Republic... is an indispensable previous condition for a stable
peace order in the world and for the restoration of the belief in basic human
rights, the dignity and value of man and for the preservation of the rights of
each individual person. 165
This vaguely worded section was broadly construed. "The relentless
punishment of crimes against the sovereignty of the G.D.R." was of para-
mount importance, and was construed in conjunction with the Penal
Code's treatment of murder. Although Article 112 of the Penal Code pro-
hibited murder, 166 murder by the state was legitimate. Article 112 specifi-
cally permitted the state to impose the death penalty if an act either
constituted a crime against the sovereignty of the G.D.R., or was committed
out of an attitude of hostility against the G.D.R. 167 The exact language was
a broad mandate for "relentless punishment" against such crimes. The bor-
der guards were protecting the state.16 8 Thus, the prohibition against mur-
160. Reiner Oschmann, Under Orders to Shoot on Sight, THE Irn EnmrarD, Sept. 24,
1991, at 14.
161. Kinzer, supra note 125 (quoting Ingo Heinrich, defendant border guard at the
first trial, convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to three and a half years in prison).
162. See discussion of East German National Defense Council, supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
163. Id.
164. Adams, supra note 155, at 291.
165. GDR Penal Code, supra note 10, Special Part, First Chapter (Crimes Against the
Sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, Peace, Humanity and Human Rights).
166. See supra note 158.
167. Id.
168. Rolf Bossi, the defense attorney for the border guards in a 1991 trial, argued that
there should be no trial, because the guards were simply fulfilling their orders and their
duty to the state. Marshall, supra note 98; Guards go on Trial, THE Fi I'qcIw PosT, Sept.
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der conflicted with the laws to protect national security. 169
Consistent with Article 112's concern with sovereignty, Article 18
stated:
Anyone infringing rights or interests of other persons with a view to averting
present threats, which cannot be averted in any other way, to himself,
another person or the Socialist state and social order does not commit an
offence as long as his act is commensurate with the nature and extent of the
danger. 170
A guard would not be convicted if he believed that a threat to either himself
or the state could be prevented only by using deadly force. Further, Article
17(1) stated, "A person who wards off a present illegal attack against...
the Socialist state and social order in a manner commensurate with the
nature of the attack, acts in the interest of Socialist society and its legality,
and thus does not commit any punishable act."171 Article 17(2) also
excused any illegal action in the case of extenuating circumstances.1 72 A
border guard could therefore argue under G.D.R. law that "even if shooting
at escapees was an excessive response, a court should forego punishment
because of the high emotional state a border guard maintained as a result
of his indoctrination."' 73
Oschmann, the former border guard, related the emotional state of the
border guards. Oschmann stated: "The psychological pressure was
immense. And nobody who has not experienced it at first hand can really
appreciate what it was like. [Guards carried out their orders to shoot
because they were] terrified of the possible punishment."1 74 Even if a bor-
der guard thought it was wrong to shoot, he would have felt forced to do so,
rather than face arrest, humiliation, and demotion. 175 In addition to the
3, 1991, sec. 1, at 2 ("The defence attorney said that East Germany had no right of
emigration and so the border guards has the right to use their weapons to prevent illegal
crossing of the border."), F.x-Border Guards on Trial in Berlin, Cm. TPIB., Sept. 3, 1991,
News, at 8 ("Defenders argue the guards had no choice but to shoot because the East
German leadership outlawed 'escape from the republic' and issued a 'shoot-to-kill' order
to enforce the measure.").
169. Marshall, supra note 11, at 103. The prohibition against murder in Article 112
was in direct conflict with "clearly established procedures set out for border guards that
allowed shooting as a last resort to anyone fleeing to the West." Id.
170. GDR Penal Code, supra note 10, art. 18(2) (State of Distress and Coercion).
171. GDR Penal Code, supra note 10, art. 17(1) (Legitimate Defence).
172. "Should [a person] overstep the limits of legitimate defence, penal measures may
be dispensed with if the person who acts has logically been placed into a state of high
emotion and therefore exceeded the limits of legitimate defence." GDR Penal Code,
supra note 10, art. 17(2)(Legitimate Defence).
173. Adams, supra note 155, at 293. That border guards were kept in a constant state
of high tension has been attested to by the guards themselves. See Marshall, supra note
98 (testimony of former guard Lutz Rathenow: "they tried to keep us constantly ready to
kill"); Oschmann, supra note 160.
174. Oschmann, supra note 160.
175. Id. Oschmann writes of a colleague who, unsure whether he heard an escapee or
a wild boar, did not give an order to fire. When it was determined that the noise was a
successful escapee, Oschmanr's colleague was taken into custody, questioned about his
loyalty, tried before a military tribunal, demoted to private, and then discharged from
the army. Id.
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consequences for failing one's duty at the border, the command level
officers set up a reward system for guards who successfully stopped a flee-
ing East German. Although the rewards varied, a guard who performed his
duty could expect a commendation, a small party, a cash bonus, or some
extra vacation time. 176
IV. International Law in East Germany
If the border guards did not violate East German law, 17 7 the question then
becomes whether East German law violated international law and whether
following East German law was a transgression thereof. The government's
argument has centered on the fact that East Germany violated international
law from the beginning. Indeed, the charges "hinge[ld] to a large extent on
the ability to prove East Germany's adherence to international law ...
which made the shooting orders illegal." 178 However, it is unclear that the
orders to shoot escaping citizens actually violated international law.
A. International Criminal Law
East Germany's commitment to obey international law was manifested in
its Constitution. Article 8(1) of the G.D.R. Constitution stated that "[t]he
generally accepted rules of international law serving peace and peaceful
international cooperation are binding upon the state and every citizen."17 9
Further, Article 91 stated that "[t]he generally accepted norms of interna-
tional law relating to the punishment of crimes against peace and human-
ity and of war crimes are directly valid law."18 0
The government of the G.D.R. was conscientious about adopting into
domestic law most fundamental elements of international criminal law.
Pursuant to the express constitutional commitment to international law,
the East German Penal Code contained sections concerning international
crimes. 18 1 For example, Article 85 of the Penal Code outlawed planning
and waging war;182 Article 86 prohibited aggressive acts; 18 3 Article 88 pro-
176. Although accounts vary, it is reported that shortly after the shooting that led to
the first border guard trial, the four guards on duty and responsible for the shootings
were given commendations, a few days extra vacation, about 100 Marks, and a special
buffet dinner. See, e.g., Kiefer, supra note 124; Tagliabue, supra note 3.
177. See discussion supra Part I1.
178. Marshall, supra note 104.
179. VMFASSUNG, supra note 27, art. 8(1).
180. Id. art. 91.
181. GDR Penal Code, supra note 10, Special Part, First Chapter (Crimes Against the
Sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, Peace, Humanity and Human Rights).
182. "A person who collaborates, in a responsible State, political, military or eco-
nomic function in the threatening, plotting, preparation or waging of a war of aggression
is liable to prison not below ten years, life imprisonment or the death penalty." Id. art.
85 (Planning and Waging of Aggressive Wars).
183. "A person who undertakes to carry out an aggressive act against the territorial
integrity or political independence of the German Democratic Republic or any other
state... is liable to imprisonment of not less than three years .... In particular serious
cases imprisonment for life or the death penalty may be imposed." Id. art. 86 (Prepara-
tion and Carrying out of Aggressive Acts).
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hibited oppression;' 8 4 Article 91 banned crimes against humanity;' 8 5 and
Article 93 outlawed war crimes.186
All of the crimes prohibited by the Penal Code are generally accepted
as international crimes. Although there is some controversy as to what
constitutes an international crime, there is also some agreement.' 8 7 One
definition of international crimes includes unlawful use of weapons,
crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, and the taking of civilian hos-
tages.' 88 Another view is that international crimes include piracy, slave
trade, war crimes, genocide, official torture, and racism.' 8 9 Although cata-
logues of international crimes range from the general to the specific, even a
"more specific and controversial list of international crimes does not
include the shooting of a state's own nationals as they attempt to illegally
cross the border."190 Stated another way, although shooting a person try-
ing to cross a border "denies an individual the internationally recognized
human right to emigrate or to travel freely abroad, it is apparently not an
international crime." 191 Traditional categories of international crime
include neither the border guards' direct actions nor their orders from
above.
If shooting escapees is not an international crime, then the G.D.R.
Penal Code did not fall short in failing to include such a provision, and the
sum total of the Penal Code articles, "like international criminal law gener-
ally, fail[s] to provide a legal basis for indicting the East German border
184. "A citizen of the German Democratic Republic who participates in war-like activ-
ities for the oppression of a people is liable to imprisonment .... Id. art. 88 (Complic-
ity in Acts of Oppression).
185. "A person who undertakes to persecute, expel, wholly or partially destroy
national, ethnic, radical or religious groups or to commit other inhufian acts against
such groups is liable to imprisonment of not less than five years .... A person who,
thereby intentionally causes particularly serious consequences is liable to life imprison-
ment or the death penalty." Id. art. 91 (Crimes against Humanity).
186. "A person who in armed confrontations violates generally accepted rules of
international law.., is liable to imprisonment of not less than one year.... A person
who intentionally causes, by his crime, particularly serious consequences is liable to
imprisonment for life or to the death penalty." Id. art. 93 (War Crimes).
187. The following discussion will exclude categories of international crimes which
do not apply in this situation since they do not limit a state's power to exercise control
over its own population.
188. 1 M. CHERIr BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw, Crimes 1 (1986).
189. WERNmR LEVI, CoNTEMPoRARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 74 (2d ed., 1991).
190. Adams, supra note 155, at 285. Adams refers specifically to Bassiouni's fairly
inclusive list of international crimes which, despite its comprehensiveness, does not
mention lethal border protection. Id. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
191. Adams, supra note 155, at 285. There is, of course, some disagreement on this
point. For example, one view holds that states are allowed to patrol and control their
own borders, but are not allowed to use deadly force. See Brunner, supra note 60, at 216.
Even when one considers that all States are permitted to control border cross-
ings, the harsh border regime, the potentially lethal border security devices and
the use of firearms-especially at the border between the two Germanys but else-
where too-are still in contravention of international law. They serve to prevent
by force conduct which, in most cases, is simply the exercise of the human right
to freedom to travel abroad, a right which has been denied by the States in
question in disregard of international law.
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guards."192 The border guards did not commit crimes of torture, aggres-
sion, genocide, or oppression. Therefore, the guards cannot be prosecuted
under either Articles 8(1) or 91 of the G.D.R. Constitution or the "intema-
tional" articles of the Penal Code.193
B. International Human Rights Law
There are two legal models under which the actions of the border guards in
forcibly preventing defections were legal. First, international criminal law
did not address the decision to shoot defectors.194 Second, its own domes-
tic law permitted such actions. 195 However, the G.D.R. may have violated a
third model-international human rights law.
East Germany ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights (CCPR) 196 and signed the Final Act of the Conference on Secur-
ity and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Final Act). 197 In so doing, East
Germany took the first step toward subjecting itself to the rule of interna-
tional law.198 However, it declined to take the second, necessary step of
implementing those agreements in its domestic legislation. 199 Therefore,
the West German prosecutor's assertions that the secret shoot-to-kill orders
were in violation of international conventions 200 appear to be true.
While both the: CCPR and the Helsinki Final Act were designed to
"Cencourage improvements in human rights,"201 there is a difference
between the two agreements. The CCPR is a formal treaty, with legally
binding international rights and obligations, and the Helsinki Final Act is a
Id.
192. Adams, supra note 155, at 291.
193. Id.
194. See supra Part IV.A.
195. See supra Part II.
196. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 28, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, 1496th plen. mtg. at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[hereinafter CCPR]. The CCPR took effect in the G.D.R. on March 23, 1976. See Fred.
W. Reinke, Note, Treaty and Non-Treaty Human Rights Agreements: A Case Study of Free-
dom of Movement in East Germany, 24 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 647, 657 n.50 (1986).
197. Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Final Act, 14 I.L.M. 1292
(1975) (signed by 35 nations, including East Germany, on August 1, 1975) [hereinafter
Helsinki Final Act].
198. See Reinke, supra note 196, at 659.
By ratifying the CCPR, East Germany has assumed a legal duty to fulfill two
separate obligations: the obligation of means and the obligation of results. The
obligation of means is the duty to incorporate the treaty into domestic law
through the process of transformation.... The obligation of results is the duty
to guarantee the CCPR's rights in practice.
Id. For a further discussion of obligations of means and obligations of results, Reinke
refers the reader to the International Law Commission Report on the Work of its 29th
Session, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 10, at 38-66, U.N. Doc. A/32/10 (1977).
199. The G.D.R. never fulfilled either its obligations of means or of results. It violated
its obligation of means regarding the CCPR by not conforming its domestic laws to the
treaty's obligations. Reinke, supra note 196, at 659. It further violated its obligation of
results by failing to guarantee the rights granted by the CCPR in practice. Id.
200. Radin, supra note 129.
201. Reinke, supra note 196, at 656.
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document to establish non-legal policy guidelines. 20 2
1. The Helsinki Final Act
The Helsinki Final Act was signed on August 1, 1975, by the United States,
Canada, and every European country except for Albania. In general, the
Helsinki Final Act expresses the desire of the signatory states to "improve
and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to peace, security,
justice and co-operation as well as to rapprochement among themselves
and with the other States of the world."20 3
The Helsinki Final Act has three sections, called baskets: (1) security
in Europe;20 4 (2) cooperation on matters of science, technology, the envi-
ronment and economics;20 5 and (3) humanitarian issues.20 6 In basket
three, humanitarian issues, the signatory states expressed their desire to
develop better human contacts, among them freedom of movement.20 7
More specifically, the states agreed that they "intend to facilitate wider
travel by their citizens for personal or professional reasons, and to this end
they intend in particular ... to ease regulations concerning movement of
citizens from the other participating States in their territory."20 8
Application of the principles embodied in the Helsinki Final Act is
problematic, however, because the Act is non-binding and, as such, can be
ignored without penalty.20 9 That the Helsinki Final Act is non-binding is
202. Id. at 648. To determine if a treaty is legally binding, one must discover "the
parties' intent to create legal rights and obligations or to establish relations governed by
international law." Id. at 649. Intent is determined by a number of factors, including
the language of the agreement, whether the agreement has been published in national
treaty collections, or has been registered under article 102 of the United Nations Char-
ter. Id. The CCPR, which was adopted by the United Nations in 1966 "is a legally-
binding treaty, the provisions of which create legal rights and obligations governed by
international law." Id. The Helsinki Final Act, on the other hand, does not create "legal
norms to govern relations between parties." Id. at 654 (citing Russell, The Helsinki Dec-
laration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?, 70 Am. J. INT'L L. 242, 246 (1976)).
203. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 197, pmbl.
204. Id. at 1293.
205. Id. at 1299.
206. Id. at 1313.
207. The states made it "their aim to facilitate freer movement and contacts, individu-
ally and collectively, whether privately or officially, among persons, institutions and
organizations of the participating States, and to contribute to the solution of the humani-
tarian problems that arise in that connexion." Helsinki Final Act, supra note 197, basket
3, sec. 1.
208. Id. at basket 3, sec. 1(d). The Helsinki Final Act embodied the signatory states'
desire, among other things, to increase the ease of travel within Europe. However, the
Warsaw Pact states did not allow freedom of movement outside their own countries,
except to other Warsaw Pact states. Brunner, supra note 60, at 187-231.
209. While there is no penalty within the Helsinki Final Act itself, some countries
have acted unilaterally to try to enforce the terms of the agreement. For example, the
United States passed the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment in the late 1970s, which
linked trade with the Soviet Union with emigration from that country. WILuAM KoREY,
THE PROMISES WE KEEP: HuMAN RIGHTs, T E Hism~iNu PRocEss, AND AMERICAN FoRIGN
PoLIcY 24 (1993). If the Soviet Union did not grant free emigration, the United States
would deny Most Favored Nation trading status. Id. at 54. The Jackson-Vanik Amend-
ment ultimately proved successful in getting the Soviet Union to lift many of its emigra-
tion restrictions.
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evidenced by a number of aspects of the agreement. For example, "[b]oth
the preparatory materials and the fact that the agreement was made
expressly ineligible for U.N. registration under article 102 of the U.N.
Charter suggest that the parties did not intend to become legally
bound."2 10 Further, the Helsinki Final Act's Declaration on Principles
"repeats the concept that principles are to guide rather than to govern rela-
tions."2 11 Lastly, the Helsinki Final Act purposely remained non-legal at
U.S. insistence, in order to obviate the need for Congressional ratification.
This would avoid a situation in which "any ambiguity as to the legal nature
of the texts could become the source of an unnecessary dispute with
Congress."2 12
There is also evidence that the Eastern Bloc countries that signed the
Helsinki Final Act never intended to observe its requirements. For exam-
ple, "as a recent disclosure in a leading Soviet journal made clear, the
Kremlin had no intention in 1975 or afterward of honoring the Helsinki
accord's references to human rights .... According to the journal, the
'conceptual political content' of Helsinki, as related to human rights, would
be 'practically disregarded."' 2 13 Therefore, although one of the definitive
statements of human rights, the Helsinki Final Act provides no teeth for
enforcement.
On the other hand, some of the principles espoused in the Helsinki
Final Act, such as those guaranteeing territorial integrity, inviolable fron-
tiers, the renunciation of force to solve disputes, the prohibition of inter-
vention in domestic affairs of a foreign state, and the right to self-
determination, are also found in other documents which are unquestiona-
bly binding on the signatories, most notably the United Nations Char-
ter.2 1 4 Therefore, some argue that "the fact that the [parties to the Helsinki
Final Act] expressly wished to avoid hard and fast legal obligations flowing
from the Act did not diminish their obligation under international law to
uphold those principles."2 15
However, "[s]ince the Act was not a treaty, the 35 signatory States were
not parties to it in the legal sense and therefore could not legally invoke
breaches of obligations and duties under it-unless these obligations were
already binding under general international law and invocable in other
contexts." 2 16 Since the right to freedom of movement and emigration is
neither provided for under general international law nor invocable in other
210. Reinke, supra note 196, at 654.
211. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 197. The Declaration on Principles in basket one
indicates in its title that it is to "guide" relations between states, rather than to "obligate"
states. Id. basket 1, sec. l(a). The Declaration of Principles says again at its conclusion
that the following principles are to guide the mutual relations of the participating states.
Id.
212. Reinke, supra note 196, 654 n.36.
213. Komay, supra note 209, at xxi (citing Andrei Zagorsky & Yuri Kashlev, The
Human Dimension of PolitiCs, Ir'L AFF., Mar. 1990, at 62).
214. Frans G. von der Dunk & Peter H. Kooijmans, The Unification of Germany and
International Law, 12 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 510, 532 (1991).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 533.
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contexts, such as the U.N. Charter, the Helsinki Final Act is not binding in
that regard.
2. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) appears to
have more binding effect on the G.D.R. than does the Helsinld Final Act. 217
The CCPR states in Article 12(2) that "[e]veryone shall be free to leave any
country, including his own."2 18
As such, preventing a citizen of the G.D.R. from leaving the country
violated international law, as reflected in the CCPR. But it is questionable
whether East Germany, in fact, ever accepted the principles of the
CCPR.2 19 Indeed, although the G.D.R. undertook an international obliga-
tion to adhere to the CCPR, it "clearly failed to recognize [the right to free-
dom of movement and to leave, guaranteed by the CCPR] internally in
either its national system of laws or in administrative practice."220
The G.D.R. Constitution did not guarantee freedom of international
movement. Article 32 stated only that "[e]very citizen of the German Dem-
ocratic Republic has the right to move freely within the state territory of the
German Democratic Republic within the framework of the laws."221 There
was no similar guarantee of the right to emigrate. 222 The G.D.R. argued
that internal freedom of movement was sufficient to satisfy the require-
ments of the CCPR, and therefore it did not violate its international
217. In addition, the CCPR has an enforcement mechanism, implemented by the
Human Rights Committee. As envisioned in the Covenant itself, "[t]here shall be estab-
lished a Human Rights Committee. It shall consist of eighteen members and shall carry
out the functions hereinafter provided." CCPR, supra note 196, art. 28. The Committee
is to hear complaints of violations of the CCPth
If a State Party to the present Covenant considers another State Party is not
giving effect to the provisions of the present Covenant, it may, by written com-
munication, bring the matter to the attention of that State Party.... If the
matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both State Parties concerned within
six months . . . either State shall have the right to refer the matter to the
Committee ....
Id. art. 41(1)(a,c).
218. Id. art. 12(2).
219. It is one thing to ratify an international treaty, technically binding the ratifying
party to the treaty, and another thing altogether to transform a treaty into domestic law.
A treaty must be "transformed" or "incorporated" into the domestic law of a state before
its terms become legally binding for that state's citizens. Reinke, supra note 196, at 649
n. 11. The G.D.R. never included the CCPR guarantee of "freedom to leave" in its domes-
tic law. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.2.b.-c.
220. Adams, supra note 155, at 285.
221. VERFASSUNG, supra note 27, art. 32.
222. Article 33 of the G.D.R. Constitution did guarantee East German citizens the
legal protection of the G.D.R. when abroad, implying that it was possible for citizens to
leave the country. However, that right extended only to visitation, and was quite restric-
tive. See id. art. 33. Reality more closely resembled Article 213 of the Penal Code. That
article, concerning Unauthorized Frontier Crossing, stated that "[a] person who ... fails
to adhere to legal regulations or prescribed limitations regarding entry and exit, travel
routes and time and local restrictions... or without government authority leaves or fails
to return to the German Democratic Republic is liable to imprisonment of up to two
years." GDR Penal Code, supra note 10, art. 213.
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obligations.223
The East German argument was not correct. The G.D.R. argued that
its emigration restrictions were consistent with an escape clause within the
CCPR to the basic right of emigration provided for in Article 12(2).
2 24
Although Article 12(2)'s guarantee to "be free to leave any country" is
worded definitively, Article 12(3) modifies it, allowing a state to implement
restrictions on the right to leave, as long as those restrictions "are provided
by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre pub-
lic), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are
consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant."
225
The G.D.R. claimed the right to restrict the freedom to leave as a matter of
public order,226 a claim that was clearly inappropriate. The escape clause
was intended to operate only as an exception, not as a rule.227 When the
G.D.R. routinely denied emigration permits, the right to travel became the
exception, rather than the rule.228 Nevertheless, the G.D.R. did not change
its Constitution to conform to the CCPR rule on emigration rights.
Similarly, the G.D.R. Penal Code also failed to allow freedom of move-
ment. To the contrary, Article II of the First Chapter of the Penal Code,
which set out "Fundamentals of the Socialist State Order and Socialist
Society," stated only that "[tlhe Socialist order guarantees that within its
scope every citizen may shape his life in complete safeguarding of his dig-
nity, his liberty and his human rights and in conformity with the rights
and interests of Socialist society, the state and its citizens."229 As with the
Constitution, the G.D.R. did not adopt the CCPR rule on emigration rights
in its Penal Code.
The failure to incorporate the CCPR into the law of the G.D.R. violated
the terms of the agreement. 230 Article 2(2) states that "[e]ach State Party to
the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps ... to adopt
such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the
rights recognized in the present Covenant." 231 East Germany did not
implement many portions of the CCPR, notably Article 12, the guarantee of
freedom to leave any country, including one's own.
Although East Germany may have violated the CCPR by not adopting
it into domestic law, it should not be surprising that the G.D.R. did not
223. Reinke, supra note 196, at 664.
224. CCPR, supra note 196, art. 12(2).
225. Id. art. 12(3).
226. The G.D.R. argued that its restrictions on emigration were necessary only "to
protect national security, public order, public health or morals or rights and freedoms of
others, as set forth in Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Covenant." Reinke, supra note 196,
at 664 n.100 (citing Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article
40 of the Covenant (German Democratic Republic), 19 U.N. Human Rights Comm. Add.
(No. 2), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/28 Add. 2 (1983), reprinted in 10 G.D.R. CoMMIrrr ON
HuMAN RIGHTS, BULLEnN 39 (1984)).
227. Reinke, supra note 196, at 665.
228. Id.
229. GDR Penal Code, supra note 10, general part, ch. I, art. I.
230. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
231. CCPR, supra note 196, art. 2(2).
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amend either the Constitution or the Penal Code to incorporate the require-
ments of the CCPR or the Helsinki Final Act. In general, "[ifn the Warsaw
Pact States, freedom to emigrate is not recognized either as a basic constitu-
tional right or as a subjective public right guaranteed by ordinary law. It is,
to some extent, made out to be incompatible with the nature of socialist soci-
ety."232 If that view is correct, and the right to emigrate is indeed incom-
patible with the nature of socialist society, it appears that the G.D.R. never
intended the CCPR or the Helsinki Final Act to dictate its own internal
compliance with those measures.
V. German Jurisdiction to Adjudicate
Despite East Germany's obligation to and violation of international human
rights law, discussion concerning such a violation is, in fact, academic.
The border guard indictments have not been brought under international
law. Since Germany is unified, West Germany can no longer bring suit
against East Germany in an international forum. The two countries no
longer exist as separate entities, therefore the indictments have become a
purely domestic matter.
The Treaty on German Unity expressly states that defendants accused
of crimes committed in East Germany can be prosecuted only under prior
East German law.2 33 There is no cause of action if the border guards did
not violate East German law. Guarding the border with force was within
the limits of G.D.R. law.234
Another option would be for the government to bring suit under West
German law. However, it is unclear that the government has authority to
sue former East German parties for alleged breaches of West German law.
Whether it can depends upon whether the G.D.R. was ever a separate coun-
try, or was merely temporarily alienated from a unified Germany.
A. Argument for Applying West German Law
The principal argument for applying West German law in the border guard
trials is that the F.R.G. never considered the G.D.R. a separate country.
Proponents of this view maintain that the West German government
refused to recognize East Germany as a separate state, even after both
countries became full members of the United Nations.235 The refusal to
recognize the G.D.R.'s legitimacy is based on the fact that "[t]he F.R.G. con-
sidered the attempt at secession by the G.D.R. from the German state ... as
invalid as long as the people in the G.D.R. could not exercise their right of
self-determination." 236 According to this view, West Germany's view of the
232. Brunner, supra note 60, at 217.
233. Treaty on German Unity, supra note 91, art. 9.
234. See supra Part III.
235. Helmut Steinberger, Germany Reunified: International and Constitutional
Problems, 1992 BYU L. REv. 23, 26.
236. Id.
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two Germanys as one is manifested in the Basic Law.2 37
The Constitution indicates that there was only one Germany, but that
some citizens were simply prevented from taking part in its political activi-
ties. Article 146 of the Basic Law states, "This Basic Law shall become
invalid on the day when a constitution adopted in a free decision by the
German people comes into force."238 Another example of the F.R.G.'s view
that East and West Germany remained unified is that the Basic Law
granted citizenship to all Germans, whether living in the West, East, or
elsewhere. 239 As a result, all East German citizens, "Who were exiled to or
fled to the West between 1949 and 1990 enjoyed the same political and
237. Floy Jeffares, Note, The Gentle Revolution: German Unification in Retrospect, 20
DE-v. J. INT'L L. & Poi'Y 537, 538 (1992) ("The very name Basic Law, instead of Consti-
tution (Verfassung), indicates that the F.R.G. regarded itself as a temporary political
entity."). See also Gregory v.S. McCurdy, Note, German Reunification: Historical and
Legal Roots of Germany's Rapid Progress Towards Unity, 22 N.Y.U. J. IN'L L. & PoL. 253,
257 (1990) ("From its inception, the Federal Republic has regarded itself as a temporary
political entity .... Indeed, the founding fathers of the Federal Republic chose to call
the nation's organizing document a 'basic law' rather than a constitution to underscore
its provisional nature.").
238. GRUNDGESErZ, supra note 93, art. 146. The Basic Law was written with a view
toward its future disappearance. See also McCurdy, supra note 237, at 258 ("[Tlhe Basic
Law contains a rather unusual provision among world constitutions that affirms its
impermanence," referring to Article 146.).
McCurdy points to what he identifies as the "most direct statement of what has
become known as the reunification commandment." McCurdy, supra note 237, at 258.
McCurdy cites the preamble of the Basic Law, which reads as follows:
Conscious of its responsibility before God and mankind, filled with the resolve
to preserve its national and political unity and to serve world peace as an equal
partner in a united Europe, the German people in the [West German] Lander
has, by virtue of its constituent power, enacted this Basic law of the Federal
Republic of Germany to give a new order to political life for a transitional
period.
It acted also on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied.
The entire German people is called upon to accomplish, by free and self-determi-
nation, the unity and freedom of Germany.
GRUNDGESETZ, supra note 93, preamble. McCurdy explains the Preamble:
Each sentence refers to the desire to maintain the unity of Germany despite its
division into [East and West]. The first sentence lists the German people's "will
to preserve its national and state unity," along with the desire to "serve world
peace as a coequal member of a united Europe," as the motivations for the
eleven western Lander to establish the Basic Law. The second sentence asserts
the unity of the German people by emphasizing that, in establishing the Basic
Law, the Germans in the [West German] Lander. . . "have also acted for those
Germans who were prohibited from participating." The third sentence, com-
monly known as the "constitutional reunification commandment," addresses
the national unity issue most directly: "The entire German people remains
called upon to complete the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-
determination."
McCurdy, supra note 237, at 258-59.
239. Article 116 of the Basic Law has two provisions concerning German nationality:
1. Unless otherwise regulated by law, a German within the meaning of this Basic
Law is a person who possesses German nationality or who has been accepted in
the territory of the German Reich [translated as, variously, "empire," "reign,"
"kingdom," or even "domain," and which includes all of former East and West
Germany] as at 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German stock or
as the spouse or descendant of such person.
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economic rights as citizens of the F.R.G." 240 Although the Basic Law "did
not claim to be effective outside of the borders of the Federal Republic, all
'Germans'-including residents of the GDR-could claim rights under the
Basic Law as soon as they came within the territory covered by the
document."241
If the continuing unity theory is correct, then West German law
applies in the border guard trials. The Basic Law had no allowance for
state-sponsored shooting of citizens.242 If Germany had remained one
state despite the political division, then the order to shoot citizens would
have been illegal even in the East, and West Germany would have jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate. East Germans would have remained simply "German"
citizens, and would have been subject to West German, or simply "Ger-
man," law. Indeed, the courts have confirmed that East Germany was never
a separate state.243
B. Argument for Applying East German Law
In contrast to the F.R.G.'s belief that Germany remained unified in law and
spirit, if not in practice, the G.D.R. considered the two Germanys separate.
Evidence of the East German view can be found in the G.D.R. Constitution.
Unlike the F.R.G.'s Basic Law, the G.D.R. Constitution "mentioned neither
the possibility nor the desirability of reunification."244 On the contrary,
2. Former German national who between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945 [the
period of Adolph Hitler's and the Nazis' tenure in power] were deprived of their
nationality for political, racial or religious reasons, and their descendants, shall
be regranted citizenship on application. They shall not be considered to have
lost citizenship insofar as they took up residence in Germany after 8 May 1945
and have not expressed a wish to the contrary.
GRUNDGESETZ, supra note 93, art. 116.
240. Jeffares, supra note 237, at 538 (citing Article 116 of the Basic Law, see supra
note 239). The term "German," as used in Article 116, included people living in the
G.D.R. Id.
241. Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Law of German Unification, 50 MD. L. REv. 475,
481 (1991).
242. The Basic Law guaranteed "the right to life and physical inviolability. The free-
dom of the individual shall be inviolable." GRUNDGEsErz, supra note 93, art. 2. The
G.D.R. Constitution, by contrast, had no such comparable guarantee of life, health or
freedom.
243. Steinberger points to three decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court of West
Germany, in 1973, 1987, and 1990, all of which "constantly upheld this legal evalua-
tion." Steinberger, supra note 235, at 26 (citing Judgment of July 31, 1973, 36 Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (decisions of the constitutional court of the
Federal Republic of Germany) [hereinafter BVerfGE] 1; Judgment of Oct. 21, 1987, 77
BVerfGE 137; Judgment of Sept. 29, 1990, 82 BVerfGE 322).
However, another view maintains that, despite its technically upholding the existence
of one Germany, the Court implicitly recognized the reality of two Germanys. See dis-
cussion of the Treaty on Intra-German Relations, infra Part V.B.1.
244. Jeffares, supra note 237, at 538. Although the Constitution of the German Demo-
cratic Republic does not specifically state that the two Germanys would never be
reunited, a strong inference can be drawn that is, in fact, the case. See VERFASSUNG, supra
note 27, art. 6(2) ("The German Democratic Republic is for ever and irrevocably allied
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.... The German Democratic Republic is an
inseparable part of the community of socialist states.").
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the G.D.R Constitution seems to have specifically avoided the question of a
duty to strive for unification. 245 By this action, the G.D.R. "implicitly
claimed to be a State in its own right;. German indeed, but without any
legal ties to the former Reich, and on this basis without any urge for
(re)unification." 246
1. Separate Germanys-The Treaty on the Basis of Intra-German Relations
The Treaty on the Basis of Intra-German Relations, 24 7 signed in 1972,
seems to uphold the G.D.R.'s claim that the two Germanys were separate
countries. In fact, the Christian Social Government of Bavaria thought that
the Treaty established the two Germanys as separate, and it brought suit in
1972 against the Federal Government in Bonn for violating the "reunifica-
tion commandment" in the preamble to the Basic Law.248 In the Treaty,
West and East Germany expressly recognized each other's independence
and legitimacy.2 49 The Treaty assumed that neither the East nor the West
German state would have any official control over the other. For example,
Article 4 of the Treaty stated that the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. "proceed on the
assumption that neither of the two States can represent the other in the
international sphere or act on its behalf."25 0 Article 6 further states that
the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. "proceed on the principle that the sovereign juris-
diction of each of the two States is confined to its own territory. They
respect each other's independence and autonomy in their internal and
external affairs." 25 1
The two Germanys also recognized the integrity of their borders, stat-
ing that they "reaffirm the inviolability now and in the future of the frontier
existing between them and undertake fully to respect each other's territo-
245. Von der Dunk & Kooijmans, supra note 214, at 520. Von der Dunk and
Kooijmans do, however, see this rejection of German unity as a slow process, one which
evolved through three versions of the G.D.R. Constitution. Id. at 520 n.47. Article 1 of
the first draft of the 1949 Constitution reads "Germany is an indivisible democratic
republic formed by the German Under [states]." Id. Article 8 of the 1968 Constitution
called for "reunification on the basis of democracy and socialism." Id. Implicit in this
call for reunification is the view that the states were actually separate. The third version,
from 1974, see supra note 27, contained neither a claim of unity nor a call for reunifica-
tion. This recognition of the separateness of the states occurred after the F.R.G. and the
G.D.R. signed the 1972 Treaty on Intra-German Relations (see infra note 247). Id. The
G.D.R. regarded the Treaty on Intra-German Relations as a "moment of truth," in which
the F.R.G. recognized its "full and unequivocal statehood." Id. at 520.
246. Von der Dunk & Kooijmans, supra note 214, at 520.
247. Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and
the German Democratic Republic, December 21, 1972, F.R.G.-G.D.R., 12 I.L.M. 16
(1973) [hereinafter Treaty on Intra-German Relations].
248. The Christian Social Government of Bavaria asked the Federal Constitutional
Court to declare the treaty unconstitutional, because it disregarded the language in the
preamble to the Basic Law. McCurdy, supra note 237, at 267. That language stated that
"[t]he entire German people is called upon to accomplish, by free self-determination, the
unity and freedom of Germany." GRUNDGESETZ, supra note 93, preamble.
249. See von der Dunk & Kooijmans, supra note 214, at 520.
250. Treaty on Intra-German Relations, supra note 247, art. 4.
251. Id. art. 6.
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rial integrity."252 Therefore, the treaty could have been viewed as "a rejec-
tion of the theory that the Federal Republic was acting for all of a
continuing 'German Reich,' because it could have been seen as the recogni-
tion of the GDR as a separate state."25 3 Indeed, "the treaty's text greatly
bolstered the G.D.R.'s claim to sovereignty and independence rather than
furthered the Basic Law's reunification commandment."25 4
Determining whether pre-1990 Germany was one country or two is
critical. If East and West Germany were separate countries, only custom-
ary international law or express treaties would govern actions which took
place between the two sovereign states, since "[international law] is appli-
cable primarily in legal disputes among nations and not in disputes of law
internal to a state."255 However, if one accepts that East Germany has
always been a part of West Germany, then the government cannot bring a
suit for violation of international law. If there was one Germany, then both
East and West Germany were bound to the same laws and conventions.
However, if there were two Germanys, then East Germany had the right to
manage its own affairs. Both international law and West Germany's Penal
Code would prohibit putting a citizen of another state on trial in West
Germany, unless the foreign citizen had violated the law of West
Germany.25 6
West Germany adopted the rule of international law in the Basic
Law.25 7 The Basic Law, by which unified Germany is now governed, states
252. Id. art. 3.
253. Quint, supra note 241, at 482. In its 1973 decision on the validity of the Treaty,
the Federal Constitutional Court narrowly upheld the treaty. See Judgment of July 31,
1973, 36 BVerfGE 1, supra note 243. The Court upheld the treaty, but "also firmly reas-
serted the theory of the continuing 'German Reich."' Quint, supra note 241, at 482. The
Court nonetheless "seemed to acknowledge the reality of the German Democratic
Republic as a separate state and confirmed the legal effectiveness of its constitution." Id.
at 482-83.
254. McCurdy, supra note 237, at 269. The Federal Constitutional Court found that
the treaty was constitutional despite the fact that this meant recognizing the G.D.R. as a
sovereign nation, thereby violating the Basic Law's goal of reunification. In 1973,
months after the Treaty on Intra-German Relations was signed, the court stated:
[W]hile it is a bilateral treaty between two states pursuant to international law
... it is also a treaty between two states that are parts of one still existing state
that is paralyzed because it has not yet been reorganized in its entirety, but that
has an undivided citizenship, and whose borders it is not necessary to further
specify at this point.
Judgement of July 31, 1973, 36 BVerfGE at 23, 27.
Further, by signing the treaty, the F.R.G. gave up its claim to being the exclusive repre-
sentative of the German people, as expressed in the Preamble to the Basic Law. See
GRUNDGESE-Z, supra note 93, preamble. The F.R.G. attempted to maintain this claim
after 1972, but the claim did not coincide with the reality of the international situation.
"[B]y recognizing the GDR (insofar as they had not already recognized it) other States
ceased to acquiesce in this claim. So for all practical purposes the FRG could no longer
claim, in respect of third states, to be the sole representative of the German people." Von
der Dunk & Kooijmans, supra note 214, at 523.
255. Zumwalt & Zumwalt, supra note 135.
256. See infra Part V.B.2.
257. Article 25 of the Basic Law states that "[tihe general rules of international law
shall form part of federal law." GRUNDGESETZ, supra note 93, art. 25.
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that international disputes should be settled in an international forum, 25 8
not in a West German court.25 9 Indeed, "[a]n argument can be made that
West German law should not be applicable as the act in question took
place in a then sovereign East Germany, and thus involved only East Ger-
man citizens."260
2. West German Acceptance of East German Law-The West German
Penal Code
West German Penal Code provisions also would have precluded assertion
of jurisdiction over East German border guards, as the Code made no pro-
vision for jurisdiction over such acts as those committed by the border
guards. The Penal Code states that "[c]onduct may be punished only if it
has been made punishable by statute prior to the commission of the act,"
and that it applies to acts committed within Germany.261 The command to
shoot defectors was not punishable by statute prior to 1990, and therefore
would not fall under this provision of the Penal Code.
The Penal Code also applied to conduct outside Germany that affected
domestic legal interests, such as planning a war of aggression, treason,
endangering democracy, crimes against the national defense, abduction,
breach of trade secrets, perjury, crimes against the environment, and acts
against government employees. 262 Further, the Penal Code made itself
applicable to conduct outside Germany which affected internationally pro-
tected interests, such as crimes of genocide, crimes involving atomic
energy, attacks on air traffic, encouraging prostitution and white slavery,
narcotics crimes, counterfeiting, economic subsidy fraud, and acts commit-
ted abroad which had been made punishable by treaty.2 63 The act of
shooting an East German should not be viewed as equivalent to mounting a
war of aggression, committing treason, or undertaking any other of the
punishable offenses. Therefore, the Penal Code should not apply.
Lastly, emphasizing that the Penal Code did not apply to East German
border guards at any time, past or present, the Penal Code states that "[tihe
German criminal law is applicable to crimes committed abroad against a
German if such conduct is punishable by the law of the place where it
occurred, or if no criminal law enforcement existed at the place where the
crime was committed."264 In the first place, East German law did not pro-
258. "For the settlement of international disputes, the Federation will join a general,
comprehensive, obligatory system of international arbitration." Id. art. 24(3).
259. Although the clause in Article 24 (see GRUNDGESE'r, supra note 93, art. 24) prob-
ably refers to the International Court of Justice, it in no way precludes international
disputes from being settled in other international fora, such as the Human Rights Com-
mittee, set up as the arbitrator for disputes arising under the CCPR. See discussion
supra note 217.
260. Zumwalt & Zumwalt, supra note 135.
261. The Penal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany, §§ 1, 3, reprinted in THE
AMERucAN SEmEs oF FOREIGN PENAL CODES 28, (JosephJ. Darby trans., 1987) [hereinafter
FRG Penal Code].
262. Id. art. 5.
263. Id. art. 6.
264. Id. art. 7.
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hibit shooting escapees. 265 Furthermore, East Germany had a very effec-
tive means of criminal law enforcement. Thus, in neither case could the
West German Penal Code be interpreted as applying to East German border
guards.
3. Successor State Law
In addition to West German law's explicit exclusion of all but the most
extraordinary of East German actions from its purview, customary interna-
tional law suggests that former East German law should be applied in the
border guard trials. Customary international law, which can be deter-
mined from the "general and consistent" practices of states,266 is as bind-
ing upon states as express treaty law.267 A fundamental principle of
international law is that sovereign states are allowed to undertake deci-
sions on domestic matters without outside interference. 268 The further
question then is whether East Germany was a sovereign and independent
state.
The Montevideo Convention of 1933 lists four criteria which a nation
must meet to be a "state as a person of international law."269 A state
should "possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population;
b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations
with the other states."270 Although the Convention is technically only
binding on the signatory parties, which did not include the F.R.G. or the
G.D.R., "the Convention has been accepted generally by the international
community and it can be taken to be an accurate statement of the law."271
East Germany certainly met all of the qualifications of a state, the last of
which was evidenced by its membership in the United Nations and its rati-
fication of numerous international treaties. It is therefore logical to accept
that East and West Germany were independent sovereign nations and that
reunification was, in fact, a unification of independent states. The G.D.R.
acceded to the F.R.G. and relinquished its sovereignty in 1990, but not
before.272
The G.D.R. underwent almost "total succession," which occurs "[i]f
265. See discussion supra Part III.
266. REsTATEMEw (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW § 102 cmt. b (1986).
267. For example, the Vienna Convention, ratified by, among others, the F.R.G. and
the G.D.R., states that "the rules of customary international law will... govern questions
not regulated by the provisions of the present Convention." Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, preamble, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27. In other words, in
the absence of an express treaty on a particular matter, customary international law
governs.
268. U.N. CHARaR art. 2(7) ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall author-
ize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state .... ").
269. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933, art. 1, T.S. 881,
165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
270. Id.
271. Nin LANTE WALLAcE-BRUCE, CLAIMS TO STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAv 51
(1994).
272. Article 1 of the Reunification Treaty states that "[u]pon the accession of the Ger-
man Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany... the LAnder of [former
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the legal identity of a community is completely destroyed."2 73 When suc-
cession occurs, "[i]t seems that the successor State is only competent to
prosecute if it acquires jurisdiction over the place where the crime was
committed."27 4 This, in fact, did occur in the reunification of Germany.
By the terms of the Treaty on the Establishment of German Unity, "[u]pon
the accession [of the G.D.R. to the F.R.G.] taking effect, the Basic Law of
the Federal Republic of Germany... shall enter into force in the [states of
the G.D.R.] and in that part of Land Berlin where it has not been valid to
date."27 5 The law of former West Germany essentially replaced East Ger-
man law. It replaced the Constitution and the Penal Code, and the Western
judiciary retrained the Eastern judiciary in Western law. It would seem
that the law of the former West Germany would govern matters litigated in
the courts of unified Germany.
However, there is a caveat to the wholesale transfer of law from one
state to another. Although a successor state may prosecute if it acquires
jurisdiction over the place where the crime was committed, "U]urisdiction
of the successor State is ... limited to those actions which are crimes
within the law of the predecessor state. Whether or not such an action is a
crime in that of the successor state is immaterial."276 If it was legal in the
predecessor state, the parties engaged in the action remain immune from
suit.2 7 7 Since it seems clear that East Germany was a state independent
from West Germany, and since it was not illegal under East German law for
border guards to shoot escapees, a West German penal code does not give
rise to claims against the border guards.
Although international law makes no express statement concerning
the continuance of respective domestic law when two states combine to
form a new state, the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of Treaties 2 78 provides an appropriate model. The Convention
confirms that German courts do not have jurisdiction to hear criminal
claims against East Germans who were acting legally under laws of the
time. Article 31 of the Convention focuses specifically on the implications
of two states uniting. 279 It states:
East Germany] shall become Under of the Federal Republic of Germany." Treaty on
German Unity, supra note 91, art. 1.
273. D.P. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 34 (1956).
274. Id. at 223.
275. Treaty on German Unity, supra note 91, art. 3.
276. O'Connell, supra note 273, at 224.
277. The Vienna Convention provides that treaties are non-retroactive:
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established,
its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place
or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of
the treaty with respect to that party.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 267, art. 28.
278. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 23, 1978,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.80/31.
279. Id. art. 31.
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When two or more States unite and so form one successor State, any treaty
in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of any of them
continues in force in respect of the successor State unless:
a) the successor State and the other State party of States parties other-
wise agree; or
b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the applica-
tion of the treaty in respect of the successor State would be incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the
conditions for its operation. 280
Both subsections (a) and (b) are relevant to the situation between East and
West Germany. Per Article 31(a), there is no state to agree or object. How-
ever, it can be assumed that were the G.D.R. still in existence, it would
object strongly to the current proceedings. 28 ' In addition, bringing a crim-
inal indictment against border guards and government officials for acts
that were legal under G.D.R. law 28 2 implicates Article 31(b). The G.D.R.
was free to prosecute the guards for violating G.D.R. law if it thought they
had done so, but the government never took that action. To do so now is
dearly, as the Vienna Convention states, "incompatible with the object and
purpose" of G.D.R. law.
Conclusion
The Government of Germany seems to think that international law and
East German sovereignty may be trumped for the purposes of the border
guard trials. Germany seems to think that "the claim that sovereignty pre-
vents scrutiny of a state's human rights has been at least partially over-
come." 283 The Basic Law states that "[i]f in litigation it is doubtful whether
a rule of international law forms part of federal law and whether it creates
direct rights and duties for the individual, the courts shall obtain the
decision of the Federal Constitutional Court."284 In accordance with
the Constitutional provision, the Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) decided in 1993 that a West German court
could adjudicate the case against the border guards.28 5
Perhaps former East German law should govern criminal trials of for-
mer East German citizens, despite the fact that the allegations involve
breaking both international and West German law. The Treaty on Reunifi-
cation contains a number of articles which accept East German law for
certain purposes. For example, Article 9(1) states that "[t]he law of the
German Democratic Republic valid at the time of signing of this Treaty...
280. Id.
281. The inference can be drawn from statements such as those made by former
G.D.R. President Egon Krenz, on hearing of his indictment: "For my political activity in
the German Democratic Republic, I am not subject to the legislation of the Federal Ger-
man Republic, under national or international law." Crawshaw, supra note 112.
282. See discussion supra Part III.
283. BAssIouNt, supra note 188, at 15.
284. GRUNDGESErZ, supra note 93, art. 100(2).
285. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
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shall remain in force in so far as it is compatible with the Basic Law."286 In
addition, both the West German Penal Code and Basic Law prohibit retro-
active punishment.28 7 If shooting East Germans who were trying to escape
was legal under applicable East German law at the time of the shootings,
then no later assertion of the illegality of those acts should be permitted,
under both Penal Code and Basic Law reasoning.
East Germany was not the same state as West Germany. If the issue
was in question before 1972, it was not thereafter. It cannot be said, there-
fore, that there was one "German law" which was applicable to one "Ger-
many." From 1945 to 1989, there was only the Federal Republic of
Germany and the German Democratic Republic. West Germany had one
code of law, governed by the Basic Law and the West German Penal Code,
and East Germany had a different code of law, governed by its own consti-
tution and penal code.
East German law may have violated international law, but that is not
the relevant question. The relevant question is whether the border guards
and the Politburo violated East German law. Only if they did can they be
tried by a German court. This is specifically stated in the Unification
Treaty-crimes committed in the G.D.R. that were, as yet, unpunished,
could only be tried under East German law. The East German border
guards did not break East German law. Since the soldiers guarding the
East German border did so in conformity with East German law, their
actions should now be given the legal deference they deserve.
286. Treaty on German Unity, supra note 91, art. 9(1).
287. The Penal Code of the F.t.G. states that "Conduct may be punished only if it has
been made punishable by statute prior to the commission of the act." FRG Penal Code,
supra note 261, tit. 1, § 1. Similarly, the Basic Law states that "An act may be punished
only if it was punishable by law before the act was committed." GRUNDGESETZ, supra
note 93, art. 103(2).

